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Australian counter-terrorism offences:
Necessity and clarity in federal criminal law
reforms
Gregory Rose and Diana Nestorovska*
This article analyses the wide-ranging reform of Australian criminal law
related to terrorism. It compares the definition of terrorism utilised in recent
legislation to the emerging international standard and tests the new federal
crimes against the criteria of legislative necessity and clarity. It concludes that
the reforms were in fact necessary in the sense of filling prior gaps and
inadequacies in the criminal law but that some of the new provisions lack
clarity and will pose conundrums for law enforcement.

INTRODUCTION
This article explores one facet of Australia’s complex new system of counter-terrorism laws, namely,
the new criminal laws. The objective is to critically examine them against the criteria of necessity and
clarity. In relation to each major reform, we seek to apply a legal technical eye to see whether it is
duplicative or utile, obscure or clear. In order to do so, we describe and explain the new criminal laws
and areas of overlap with extant criminal laws, incidentally providing an overview of the field. Thus,
the definition of terrorism is examined, together with proscriptions of specific terrorist acts and
proscriptions on participation in terrorist organisations. Also considered are the terrorism preventative
orders introduced in 2005 (which formulate new criminal procedures), and certain offences that
implement counter-terror treaties, as well as recently reviewed crimes directly against the State such as
sedition and treason.

Scope
The body of criminal laws is distinguishable from that of national security laws, which have also been
substantially reformed to combat terrorism at a furious pace since 11 September 2001. The broader
function of national security laws concerning terrorist activities is mostly preventative, providing
diverse powers to gather intelligence, guard national boundaries and secure infrastructure. That wider
range of national security laws is located across a diverse range of social management sectors.
Elsewhere, we have examined security intelligence powers. Here, our focus is on criminal laws.
Criminal laws focus on largely post hoc law enforcement functions, although they do also have
preventive functions, through prosecutions of preliminary acts and their deterrent effect, as well as
through the issue of specific preventative orders.
This article will not test the reforms against supposedly universally authoritative standards of
political morality.1 That exercise would need first to embark upon an academically impossible
demonstration of what those universal standards are. Commentaries assessing Australia’s counterterror law reforms have tended to use as their universal benchmarks the human rights formulations in
United Nations instruments.2 Those formulations, however, are of uncertain applicability in the
counter-terrorism context, as fundamental questions arise as to their own universality, immutability,
*
Gregory Rose BA LLB, LLM, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong. Diana Nestorovska BA LLB
(Hons), Grad Dip Legal Practice, Researcher, University of Wollongong. The authors are grateful to Geoff MacDonald and
David Farrier for their comments on drafts. The errors remain those of the authors alone. The Australian law is current as at July
2006.
1
Nor does this article seek to examine the reforms from the standpoint of the moral or political perspectives of the authors,
whose personal opinions may diverge respecting the new provisions.
2
For example, Michaelsen C, “International Human Rights on Trial – The United Kingdom’s and Australia’s Legal Response to
9/11” (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 275.
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interpretation and application.3 Further, even if not fully consistent with provisions of international
human rights instruments, effective criminal laws properly adopted within a liberal democracy might
well pose a lesser evil than ineffective action, consistent with international human rights instruments,
against private coercion through acts of terrorism.4 We suggest that a rough but reasonable measure of
the legitimacy of counter-terror laws is the extent of their collective approval through a democratic
process that enfranchises and effectively reflects the values of the majority of persons who are
addressed by those laws.5

Analytical method
The criteria against which the counter-terrorism criminal laws are assessed in this article are necessity
and clarity.
Necessity
Liberal democracies eschew unnecessary laws.6 It is asserted by some that dedicated counter-terrorism
measures are not needed, simply because terrorism is the commission of common crimes already
proscribed by law.7 Within Australia it is no doubt true that some potential terrorist actions are already
illegal under criminal law.8 These common crimes include murder, kidnapping, assault, grievous
bodily harm, hostage taking, hijacking, malicious damage to property, interference with
communications, conspiracy, treason, smuggling and fraud. Thus, it can be generalised that a special
definition of terrorist crimes is merely an exercise in political relabeling of common crimes. Their
differences in scale and motive can be argued not to alter the character of the offensive acts, even if
they should affect the sentencing.
We consider that motive and scale can change the character of a violent act. Moreover, a careful
examination is more reliable than a generalisation concerning whether criminal laws contain
problematic gaps that could be fixed. The purpose of this inquiry is to assess whether the new laws are
duplicative, or overlap substantially and inconsistently with existing laws. In assessing the necessity of
the new terrorism crimes, we do not pretend to investigate the deeper policy questions concerning
whether they are necessary for national security. That is primarily a matter for balanced decision by
3
For a general discussion of institutional manipulation of human rights notions, see Ignatieff M, Human Rights as Politics and
Idolatry (Princeton University Press, 2001). A deontological approach to human rights, that relies on doctrinaire resort to the
moral authority of the United Nations, is especially fraught with moral risk in the field of counter-terrorism due to that
institution’s longstanding ambivalence concerning the immorality of terrorism.
4
National democratic approval often offers a better indicator of legitimacy than compliance with human rights instruments, see
Rose G, “The United Nations as a source of legal authority”, Upholding the Australian Constitution, Vol 17 (2005 Proceedings
of the Samuel Griffith Society) pp 163-174. As to an ethical approach to counter-terrorism formulated through a national
political process, see Ignatieff M, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Princeton University Press, 2004).
5
Regular election of popular representatives forms the usual method of democratic enfranchisement. Following introduction of
the 2002, 2003 and 2004 counter-terror law reform packages into the Australian Commonwealth Parliament, the incumbent
government was re-elected in 2004 with an increased majority in the lower house and a majority in the upper house (the first
government majority in the upper house in 20 years). A public poll conducted later indicated that a 62% majority of Australians
supported expansion of the counter-terrorism powers of national security agencies (Interview with Prime Minister John Howard,
Meet The Press, Channel Ten Television, 24 July 2005, transcript available at http://www.ten.com.au/library/documents/
MTP24075.doc viewed 19 May 2006.
6
Freedom from excessive government regulation, ie negative freedom, is a central tenet of liberalism. “There is a limit to the
legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against
encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.” See Mill JS,
“On Liberty” in Robson JM (ed), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol XVIII (University of Toronto Press, Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1977) p 220.
7
See, eg Commonwealth, Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Consideration of Legislation Referred to the
Committee: Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (No 2); Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Bill 2002;
Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression of Terrorist Bombings) Bill 2002; Border Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2002;
Telecommunications Interception Legislation Amendment Bill 2002 (2002). The Law Council of Australia argues that a separate
terrorist offence is not necessary: p 20. The Senate Committee also lists all the other submissions that argued that the need for
a new terrorism offence had not been demonstrated and that existing offences were adequate: Ch 3, fn 1.
8
Examples are given in Ricketts A, “Freedom of Association or Guilt by Association: Australia’s New Anti-Terrorism Laws and
the Retreat of Political Liberty” (2002) 6 Southern Cross University Law Review 133 at 145.
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democratically representative government. The roles of security policy experts, law enforcement
agencies and civil liberties specialists is to advise in their areas of competence rather than to
pronounce public policy.
Clarity
To assess clarity, individual legislative provisions are examined to determine whether they are
sufficiently specific, certain, readily understood and practicable to precisely achieve their stated
objects. This involves analysis of the actus reus (conduct) and mens rea (intention) requirements of the
new crimes for clarity of definition. If not specific and certain, the law is open to abuse, and if not
readily understood and practicable, it is not utile.
Commentators have articulated profound misgivings over the opportunities that the reforms
present for “unprecedented powers to outlaw, interrogate and jail opponents of the ruling political
establishment”.9 While it should not be assumed that the government of a liberal democracy such as
Australia would seek to abuse its powers, it is true that “eternal vigilance is the price of liberty”.
Commentators’ fears make clear delimitation of the new laws all the more important.

DEFINITION

OF TERRORISM

A legal definition of terrorism is necessary to provide a reference for the triggering of criminal law
enforcement powers. However, terrorism has been difficult to define in practice because it has been
plagued by political and ideological controversy in public discourse. Many argue that “one man’s
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”.10 While this aphorism might legitimately be employed to
withhold judgments of the political ideologies that motivate violence, it should never be used as a
shield from prosecution for the actual acts of violence. To do so allows massacres with impunity and
undermines any legal order that protects public security and human dignity.
While highly politicised, the question of what constitutes terrorism is not as legally complex as
supposed. The central principles emerging in international practice are that an act of terrorism is
distinct from other violent crimes committed by private individuals due to its contextual elements of
political conflict. The requisite elements, all of which must be present, can be analysed into categories
of violent crime and political conflict, set out in the following table:
Violent Crime

Political Conflict

Use or threat of violence

Part of a campaign

Conducted by non-State actors

Strategically generating fear

Directed against civilian targets

For a political purpose

These elements form into the following formulation: “the use or threat of violence, directed at
civilians and not overtly conducted by an official arm of State, as part of a strategic campaign aimed
to induce a state of fear for the purpose of gaining political advantage”.
This general definition applies to acts that are transnational in nature as well as to domestic acts.
It describes the violent conduct, while recognising without prejudging its motivating political purpose.
Its essence has been adopted by the United Nations, albeit only to combat the financing of terrorist
9
Head M, “Counter-terrorism Laws Threaten Fundamental Democratic Rights” (2002) 27(3) Alternative Law Journal 125. To
that effect, “[c]ounter-terrorism is frequently a Trojan horse for state terror in the form of police violence, torture, sexual assault,
illegal arrest and detention, and legal arrest and detention based on ethnicity, race, religion or class background. States, through
the military and the police, have enormous capacity to coerce citizens and inflict violence on individuals: it should not be
assumed that this power will be used benevolently”. See also McCulloch J, “War at Home: National Security Arrangements Post
11 September 2001” (2002) 27(2) Alternative Law Journal 90.
10
Ganor B, Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?, International Policy Institute for
Counter-Terrorism website, http://www.ict.org.il/aecommerce/c1410/1540.php viewed 16 January 2007.
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activities, rather than to proscribe the activities themselves.11 It is consonant with the national
definitions adopted in Australia and other jurisdictions, such as Canada12 and the United Kingdom.13
The specification of non-State actors and of civilian targets warrants some explanation. The
political use of violent force by a State against a civilian population is a breach of well established
international law. When conducted by a State in an armed conflict, such violent acts against civilians
constitute war crimes under international law.14 Outside of armed conflict, violent acts conducted by a
State against civilians are also categorised under international laws, although as crimes against
humanity or breaches of human rights or breaches of State responsibility, depending on the
circumstances.15 These breaches of international law cannot be prosecuted against the State itself in
foreign national courts, where impugned State actors enjoy sovereign immunity, but may be the
subject of other international legal processes.16
In contrast, a wide range of terrorist acts, ie the political uses of violent force by private
individuals against civilians, is not yet specifically proscribed under international law17 but can be
prosecuted in national courts under applicable national laws. Emerging international consensus on the
definition of terrorism still relies on its criminalisation under various national laws18 and terrorist acts
are, therefore, by definition committed by non-State actors.

Australian counter-terrorism laws
The Commonwealth Parliament has no general power under s 51 of the Constitution to legislate across
the Australian States and Territories with respect to crime. However, other direct or indirect powers,
such as the defence, external affairs, aliens and trade and commerce powers, can support legislation
dealing with crime. Under s 51(xxxvii) of the Constitution, States and Territories are able to refer
legislative powers to the Commonwealth and, in 2002, State and Territory leaders enacted legislation
to refer their powers relating to terrorist acts to the Federal Government.19 This gave the
11

See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism [2002] ATS 23 (9 December 1999), Art 2.1,
which provides: “Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly
or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge
that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out: (a) an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and
as defined in one of the treaties listed in the Annex; or (b) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of
such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organisation to do
or to abstain from doing any act.” The Security Council provides a general definition of theterrorism as criminal acts committed
by individuals, albeit only within the range of criminal activities proscribed by United Nations treaties. See Resolution 1566
(8 October 2004) [3].

12
See Canadian Criminal Code, Pt II.1 and notably, the definition of “terrorist activity” in s 83.01. Like Australia, Canada also
excludes “advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work” that is not intended to cause death or serious injury, endanger life or
pose a significant risk to public health or safety.
13

Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), s 1 (see n 37).

14

As to the legal nature of the circumstances that give rise to a state of armed conflict, see the Tadic Case (IT-94-1) discussed
in Cassese A, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2003) p 52. To the extent that an armed conflict is an
international or civil war, the State’s commission of violence against civilians acts falls under the international laws of armed
conflict.

15
These international laws are addressed to the State and its officials and not to private persons. Enforcement can be by
international or domestic tribunals. For more detailed discussion of this matter, see Rose G and Nestorovska D, “Towards an
ASEAN counter-terrorism treaty” (2005) 9(1) Singapore Yearbook of International Law 157.
16
For example, immunity is suspended in prosecutions before the International Criminal Court, which has jurisdiction over
crimes against humanity (Statute of the International Criminal Court, Arts 5, 7, 25-28).
17
A subgroup of terrorist acts are proscribed, such as crimes against humanity and transnational actions proscribed by the United
Nations counter-terrorism treaties.
18

Security Council Resolution 1566 (8 October 2004), referred to at n 11.

19

State and Territory referring Acts: Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 (NSW); Terrorism (Northern Territory
Request) Act 2003 (NT); Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 (Qld); Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002
(SA); Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 (Tas); Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2003 (Vic); and Terrorism
(Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 (WA).
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Commonwealth the legislative power to amend the Criminal Code to include counter-terrorism laws
and to apply those laws in the States and Territories.20 On 27 September 2005, the Council of
Australian Governments (COAG) held a special meeting to consider expanding Australia’s
counter-terrorism laws to encompass, inter alia, the use of control and preventative detention orders to
restrict the movement of suspected terrorists.21 COAG unanimously agreed to the introduction of such
laws, as set out in the COAG Communiqué,22 and State and Commonwealth leaders have since
prepared legislation to give effect to the agreement.23
The majority of the current counter-terrorism laws are located in a new Pt 5.3 of the Criminal
Code, which applies to referring States not only by virtue of s 51(xxxvii) of the Constitution but also
other Constitutional heads of power.24 For any non-referring States, therefore, Pt 5.3 applies by virtue
of Constitutional heads of power other than s 51(xxxvii).25 Thus, Pt 5.3 applies to all terrorist acts and
preliminary acts occurring within Commonwealth and State jurisdictions.26 The Criminal Code was
enacted largely as a model for States and Territories to follow for the purpose of achieving uniform
criminal laws across all jurisdictions in Australia. Because terrorist networks and acts often span
different jurisdictions, the enactment of directly applicable national laws is appropriate. That said, the
National Counter-Terrorism Plan (NCTP) stipulates that jurisdictional differences in the laws of
criminal procedure that affect prosecutions will be considered at the outset of an investigation.27
Criminal Code s 100.6(1) provides that Pt 5.3 is to be read concurrently with State and Territory laws.
However, in the event of any inconsistency it can be assumed that s 109 of the Constitution will
operate to invalidate the State laws to the extent of the inconsistency.

Australian definition of terrorist acts
Until 2002, the expression “terrorism” appeared in only a handful of Commonwealth statutes of
marginal relevance.28 Prior to 1986, the term was included in a list of matters that related to security
under s 4 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (the ASIO Act).29 But in
1986, matters of terrorism and subversion were deleted from that Act and merged into the broad crime
20

Criminal Code, s 100.2(1) and (3). The Criminal Code is set out in the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The
referral procedure that was followed is discussed in O’Neill J, Rice S and Douglas R, Retreat from Injustice: Human Rights Law
in Australia (2nd ed, Federation Press) pp 252-254.

21

See COAG website: http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/270905/#Strengthening viewed 22 November 2005. These laws are
discussed below at nn 152ff. State authority for amendment did not require amendments to State referral laws.
22

See COAG website: http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/270905.

23

See COAG website: http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/270905 and Proposals to strengthen Australia’s counter-terrorism laws
– 2005, Current Issues, Parliament of Australia website: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/LAWTerrorismLaws.htm
viewed 13 December 2005. Acts that have been passed by the State Parliaments include Terrorism (Police Powers) Amendment
(Preventative Detention) Act 2005 (NSW); Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act 2005 (Qld); Terrorism (Preventative
Detention) Act 2005 (SA); Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act 2005 (Tas); Terrorism (Community Protection) Amendment
Act 2005 (Vic); and Terrorism (Extraordinary Powers) Act 2005 (WA). The Terrorism (Extraordinary Police Powers) Bill 2006
is before the Australian Capital Territory Parliament.
24

Criminal Code, s 100.3(1).

25

Criminal Code, s 100.3(2). However, as can be seen in n 19, all States have referred their powers.

26

Criminal Code, s 100.4(2).

27

National Counter-Terrorism Plan, Item 6. See National Security Australia home page, Commonwealth Attorney-General’s
Department
website:
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/nationalsecurityHome.nsf/HeadingPagesDisplay/Home?OpenDocument
viewed 30 November 2004.
28
For example, Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth), Crimes Regulations 1990
(Cth) and Air Navigation Regulations 1947 (Cth). Indeed, the only piece of legislation in Australia that specifically dealt with
“terrorism” as a criminal act was the Northern Territory Criminal Code. See Hancock N, Terrorism and the Law in Australia:
Legislation, Commentary and Constraints, Research Paper No 12 2001-2002, Law and Bills Digest Group, 19 March 2002,
Parliament of Australia website: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2001-02/02rp12.htm viewed 22 November 2005.
29
Parliament of Australia, Bills Digest No 128 2001-02, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment
(Terrorism) Bill 2002, Parliament of Australia website: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2001-02/02bd128.htm viewed
19 May 2005.
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of “politically motivated violence”.30 In 2003, “politically motivated violence” was redefined to
explicitly include “acts that are terrorism offences”.31 Notably, in the primary relevant policy, the
National Counter-Terrorism Plan, “terrorism” was, until recently, defined simplistically as “an extreme
form of politically motivated violence”.32
The terrorist attacks of 2001 in New York and 2002 in Bali forced an initial critical reassessment
of Australia’s counter-terrorism measures.33 A major concern was that existing legal offences and
powers were not drafted specifically to address terrorism and, if utilised, could be vulnerable to legal
challenge for being inapplicable.34 For example, it is most unlikely that the existing statutory offence
of murder would have supported Australian prosecutions if the suspects in the case of the murder of
88 Australians in the Bali bombings came into Australian custody,35 given that the perpetrators were
not Australian nationals and all events occurred extraterritorially. The 2002-2003 reforms were
followed by further reviews in the wake of the Madrid 2004 and London 2005 terrorist bombings.
The Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) amended the Criminal Code, to
define a “terrorist act” and make it an offence.36 The amended Code’s definition was adapted from the
Terrorism Act 2000 (UK)37 and conforms in its essence to the model definition discussed above. Thus,
it defines serious acts of violence while placing them in the context of political conflict. In the
amended Criminal Code, “terrorist act” means any action or threat of action that falls into s 1(2) of the
provision, but does not fall under s 1(3). An act falls within s 1(2) if the action or the threat of action
30

Bills Digest No 128, n 29. See also Hancock, n 28.

31

See Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (Terrorism) Amendment Act 2003 (Cth), Sch 1, cl 4.

32

Bills Digest No 128, n 29. Also, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, n 27, Item 4 now defines “terrorist act” as “an act or threat,
intended to advance a political, ideological or religious cause by coercing or intimidating an Australian or foreign government
or the public, by causing serious harm to people or property, creating a serious risk of health and safety to the public, disrupting
trade, critical infrastructure or electronic systems.” This definition more or less adopts the definition of “terrorist act” introduced
under the Criminal Code, s 100.1.
33
The introductory section of the Report of Australia to the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the United Nations Security
Council pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001 noted that, following the
events of 11 September 2001, Australia “convened taskforces to review Australia’s systemic and legislative preparedness to
prevent or to respond to such an attack in Australia and to freeze any Australian assets of terrorists and their sponsors”. See
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade website: http://www.dfat.gov.au/icat/report_un_securitycouncil_21_december_
2001.html viewed 22 November 2005.
34

Hancock, n 28.

35

Contra, see the submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee of the Law Council of Australia, that
argued that existing crimes like murder would cover acts of terrorism and that a specific offence of terrorism was not necessary:
Consideration of Legislation Referred to the Committee, n 7.
36
Criminal Code, s 101.1. The Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW), Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 2003 (NT) and
Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 (Vic) adopt the Commonwealth definition of “terrorist act”.
37
See Terrorism Act 2000 (UK). Section 1 states that terrorism is an act falling within s 1(2), which is designed to further a
political, religious or ideological cause and the use or threat of which also “is designed to influence the government or to
intimidate the public or a section of the public”. Section 1(2) includes serious violence against a person or property, or that
endangers a person’s life, creates a serious risk to the health and safety of the public or seriously interferes with systems. Unlike
the Commonwealth Criminal Code and its Canadian counterpart (see n 12), the United Kingdom provision does not entail any
exemptions to protect civil liberties. Since the passage of the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK), other counter-terrorism legislation has
been promulgated in the United Kingdom. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK) introduced provisions
relating to freezing terrorist assets, the detention of “international terrorists” in Pt 4, and strengthening controls over the nuclear
and aviation industries as well as dangerous substances: see Explanatory Notes for the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act,
Office of Public Sector Information: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/en2001/2001en24.htm viewed 22 November 2005. The power
to impose control orders over all terror suspects, whether citizens or non-citizens, domestic or international, was enacted in the
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) – see Home Office website: http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/
legislation/pta/ viewed 22 November 2005. Finally, the Terrorism Bill 2005 (UK) was introduced in the United Kingdom
Parliament on 12 October 2005. If enacted, it would create the offence of glorifying terrorism, give the authorities powers to
strip naturalised citizens of citizenship for engaging in extremist conduct, extend the use of control orders as well as allow the
pre-charge detention of a terrorist suspect for up to 90 days. The House of Commons rejected the Bill: see Explanatory Note to
the Terrorism Bill 2005 at Office of Public Sector Information: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills/
055/en/06055x--.htm and Home Office: http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/legislation/proposedlegislation/ viewed 22 November 2005.
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would cause death or serious physical harm to a person or serious damage to property, endanger
another person’s life, create a serious health or safety risk to the public or seriously interfere with,
disrupt or destroy an electronic system. The political conflict context is set by requiring that the act
also must be done with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause as well as
with the intention of coercing or intimidating the government of the Commonwealth or a State, or
intimidating sections of the public. This definition eschews partisan exceptions for particular political,
religious or ideological causes. Section 1(3) includes a safeguard for civil liberties. It excludes
advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action from the operation of the Act, so long as such action is
not intended to cause serious harm or death to a person, endanger another person’s life or create a
serious health or safety risk to the public.
Commonwealth Criminal Code, s 100.1
Legal
Characterisation

Terrorist activity (s 100.1(2))

Legitimate political action
(s 100.1(3))

Action

•
•

serious physical harm to a person; OR
cause death or endanger another’s life;
OR
serious property damage; OR
serious public health or safety risk; OR
serious interference, disruption or destruction of an electronic system.

•
•
•
•

advocacy;
protest;
dissent;
industrial action.

advancing a political, religious or ideological cause; AND
coercing or intimidating the government;
OR
intimidating sections of the public.

•

NOT intended to cause
serious harm or death to a
person, endanger another
person’s life or create a
serious health or safety
risk to the public.

•
•
•

Intention

•
•
•

The intention of the perpetrators to coerce governments and intimidate the public was considered
by Parliament to pose sufficient threat to the fabric of the social and democratic system for related acts
of violence to be labeled as crimes more immoral than other more common random societal
tendencies to violence. This consideration reflects a wider trend in Commonwealth legislation to
relabel some violent crimes as particularly odious. The offences of genocide and crimes against
humanity recently introduced into the Criminal Code by the International Criminal Court Act 2002
(Cth) are examples.38 The offences relabel violent acts otherwise criminalised, inter alia, as murder,
instead as genocide or crimes against humanity if committed, respectively, with the intention to
destroy a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group, or with the intention or knowledge that
the murder is part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.39 These
most heinous crimes share a similar mens rea, that is, the motivation includes intention to violently
change a social order. In that respect, they do not overlap with other extant crimes of violence.
Weaknesses in clarity and specificity in the above definition arise due to its failure to confine its
operation to non-State actors and to specifically exclude the political use of violent force by States
38
Triggs G, “Implementation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court: A Quiet Revolution in Australian Law”,
(2003) 25(4) Sydney Law Review 507.
39
A person who kills one or more persons from a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group with the intention to
destroy that group is described as committing genocide (Criminal Code, s 268.3) and a person who murders one or more
persons with the intention or knowledge that the murder is part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian
population, commits a crime against humanity (s 268.8).
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themselves. This failure leads to ambiguity concerning the implicit application of proscriptions against
terrorist crimes to foreign and Australian armed service personnel or senior officials. Foreign
personnel and officials are protected by sovereign immunity (and are more appropriately subject to
international law constraints), rendering prosecution of them impracticable and inappropriate.40
Conversely, it would not have been the wish of Parliament that Australian personnel engaged overseas
on government-authorised military operations should be vulnerable to prosecution by the Director of
Public Prosecutions (as discussed below in relation to extraterritoriality). Although these examples are
far-fetched, legislative efforts to promote certainty of application by specifying safeguards against
executive abuse of the law and by specifying the circumstances of extraterritorial application have not
been as thorough as they could be.
Safeguards
Concern has been expressed that the Australian definition of a terrorist act encompasses “a wide range
of political activity, such as planning or participating in a protest outside government buildings or
facilities where damage is alleged to have occurred”.41 In response, it should be noted that the damage
must be “serious”. Although the term “serious” is not unusually ambiguous, the provision is silent as
to its meaning and uncertainty does arise.42 For example, if a computer hacker programmed the graffiti
“No War!” on the Department of Defence home website would the person properly be regarded as
committing a terrorist act? How serious is it? Further, the absence from the exemption for legitimate
political protest (in Criminal Code, s 100.1(3)) of damage to “property or to an electronic system”
excludes the hacker’s graffiti from the safeguard. Thus, if the damage is considered “serious” because
the website crashes, there is no exemption from having committed a terrorist act under s 100.1(2). It
seems incongruous that there is no exemption for unintentional serious damage to property or an
electronic system, but that there is an exemption for unintentionally causing serious injury, death or a
public health or safety risk. On this aspect, s 100.1(3) appears unclear and unsatisfactory.
Extraterritoriality
Section 100.4 of the Criminal Code gives the definition of terrorist acts extraterritorial application.
The terrorist act need not be committed in Australia and any reference to the public includes any
public outside of Australia. This would mean that, should foreign terrorists who have committed
terrorist acts in other countries enter Australian territory, the Commonwealth government has the
power to arrest and prosecute them. The extraterritorial reach of the provision is clearly necessary. The
105 Australians killed by terrorists since the year 2000 were all murdered in foreign jurisdictions.43
Extraterritorial application also creates a technical ambiguity, however, due to the implied
inclusion of State actors. For example, Australian military action undertaken overseas may cause
death, harm, damage, etc, and fall within the definition and outside the exception, irrespective of
whether it is legitimately conducted (eg military operations causing property damage that had the
unintended effect of intimidating those elements of the Iraqi public supporting the Baathist insurgency
in 2003). Although the defence of lawful authority would apply,44 it is unfortunate that Australian
40
See International Court of Justice, Arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium),
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm viewed 14 May 2006; Boister N, “The ICJ in the Belgian
Arrest Warrant Case: Arresting the Development of International Criminal Law”, (2002) 7 Journal of Conflict and Security Law
293-314; Cassese A, “The Belgian Court of Cassation v the International Court of Justice: the Sharon and others case” (2003)
1(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 437.
41

Head, n 9, p 122.

42

These concerns were noted in the Consideration of Legislation Referred to the Committee, n 7, p 35.

43

There was one Australian killed in the terrorist attack on the Sbarro Restaurant in Jerusalem on 9 August 2001; 10 in the World
Trade Centre attacks on 11 September 2001; 88 in the Bali attacks on 12 October 2002; one in the Jakarta Marriott bombing on
5 August 2003; one in the London bombing on 7 July 2005 and four in the Bali bombings on 1 October 2005. Further analogy
may be drawn with the extraterritorial reach of war crimes legislation: a war criminal who resides in Australia may never have
committed crimes against Australians, but it is accepted that he or she could be prosecuted in Australia for those acts overseas.
44

Criminal Code, s 10.5.
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military action might nevertheless otherwise fall within the definition of terrorist acts.45 In relation to
foreign personnel located within Australian jurisdiction, on the other hand, it is possible that the
current Commonwealth formulation of extraterritorial application could see the Director of Public
Prosecutions called upon to bring to reluctant Australian courts the invidious task of judging whether
foreign ministers and military personnel, as sovereign actors, are culpable for terrorist acts.46
To clarify the scope of the definition, an elaboration to the exception in s 100.4(3) needs to be
inserted to exclude legitimately conducted military acts. The more effective approach would be to
confine the definition to non-State actors by specifically excluding armed service personnel and
officials acting overtly in an official State capacity.47

Proscribed terrorist acts
The Australian definition of terrorist acts in s 100.1 of the Criminal Code provides the key to a
toolbox that contains more severe penalties, preliminary and related offences and stronger preventative
powers than for common acts of violence considered less threatening to social democratic institutions.
Inside the toolbox, the defined terrorist acts are proscribed as offences and severe penalties are set out.
In addition, subsidiary categories of supporting preliminary acts, as well as violence acts against
Australians overseas and hoaxes, are proscribed. Also related to preparations for terrorist acts are
additional crimes concerning terrorist organisations and funding terrorist activities. Due to the
complex process of listing terrorist organisations and the separate specific provisions enacted
concerning funding, these offences are separately discussed below.
Acts of or preliminary to violence
Under s 101.1, the commission of any act or threat of action set out in the definition of terrorism in
s 100.1 is an offence attracting life imprisonment.48
Related preliminary acts are set out as lesser offences. These include supporting acts that relate to
terrorist acts but do not themselves mature into terrorist acts. They are giving or receiving training or
advice connected with terrorist acts,49 possessing things related to terrorist acts,50 collecting or making
documents to facilitate terrorist acts51 or any other action in the planning or preparation of a terrorist
act.52 A person commits the preliminary offence even if a terrorist attack does not actually eventuate,
the training and preparation is not connected with a specific terrorist act, or the training and
45
As demonstrated above, breaches of international humanitarian law by sovereign actors would more appropriately be dealt
with as crimes against humanity or war crimes. In practice, allegations against Australian Defence Forces personnel would
usually be dealt with as matters of military discipline by Australian courts martial rather than the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Concerning Australian prosecution of its own military personnel, see Report of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
Committee, Effectiveness of Australia’s Military Justice System, 2005 http://www.aph.gov.au/SENATE/committee/FADT_
CTTE/miljustice/index.htm viewed 14 May 2006. Application of the definition to Australian nationals engaged in foreign armies
or militias has been specifically addressed with greater clarity in the legislative reforms.
46

See n 40.

47

Another approach would be to qualify the definition’s application to extraterritorial acts causing death, harm, damage, etc, so
that only those acts deliberately directed against non-military targets are covered. That is, attacks overseas directed primarily
against military targets would not be covered, but attacks directed primarily against civilians and civilian infrastructure would
fall within the extraterritorial application of the Criminal Code definition. Both approaches are adopted in the Canadian
Criminal Code, Pt II.1. Unlike the Australian definition of “terrorist act”, the Canadian definition excludes from its scope “an
act or omission that is committed during an armed conflict and that, at the time and in the place of its commission, is in
accordance with customary international law or conventional international law applicable to the conflict, or the activities
undertaken by military forces of a state in the exercise of their official duties, to the extent that those activities are governed by
other rules of international law”.
48

Criminal Code, s 101.1.

49

Criminal Code, s 101.2.

50

Criminal Code, s 101.4.

51

Criminal Code, s 101.5.

52

Criminal Code, s 101.6.
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preparation or engagement is connected with more than one terrorist act.53 Thus, general preparations
are proscribed even though a specific target and date have not been fixed upon.54
These provisions bear an indirect relationship to the extant common laws of attempt, conspiracy
and accessorial liability because they entail complicity and common purpose.55 Although the
preparatory acts provisions overlap aspects of the extant laws of attempt, conspiracy and accessorial
liability, the new provisions are not redundant. A major point of departure between them is that,
generally, attempt, conspiracy and accessorial liability require specific, identified acts to be planned or
attempted,56 whereas criminal acts preparatory to terrorism do not. In contrast, preparatory terrorist
acts, such as acquiring information on potential targets, attract criminal responsibility even though
they take place before a concrete plan to execute a specific terror act has been set. Further, when
compared to the common law, delimitation of the preliminary acts crimes is more precise and utile.
On first examination, a shortcoming in the preliminary acts provisions concerns a lack of clarity
as to whether responsibility extends to anyone who assists in the commission of a terrorist act, no
matter how remote their connection. However, the requirement of mens rea would seem to provide a
practical limit to the extension of criminal responsibility. There is a presumption that mens rea is an
essential ingredient in every statutory offence.57 The presumption is displaced only where a court
construes the wording and subject matter of the statute as indicating that absolute liability was to be
imposed.58 Given the explicit importance of mens rea in the definition of terrorism, courts are unlikely
to find that the legislative purpose was to impose liability irrespective of mens rea. Thus, in practice,
increasing remoteness of the supporting act is likely to be directly proportional to the increasing
difficulty of proving mens rea. If no mens rea is established, then it is clear that no offence is proved.
A layer of confusion as to the outer limits of the offences relating to preliminary acts is added
when the extant formulations of the common law crimes of attempt, conspiracy and accessorial
liability are applied to the preparatory crimes. The scope of liability for inchoate acts would be
extended to unprecedented and unworkable levels. For example, if a person were charged with
conspiracy to receive training for a terrorist act under s 101.2(1) of the Criminal Code,59 the
prosecution would need only to prove an agreement to receive training together with some kind of
overt act for the purpose of receiving training.60 In practice, however, the outer limits of the crimes of
53
Criminal Code, ss 101.2(3), 101.4(3)-101.6(3). The provisions that a terrorist attack need not occur, that training and
preparation need not be connected with a specific terrorist act or the training, and that preparation or engagement can be
connected with more than one terrorist act, were introduced into Criminal Code, ss 101.2(3), 101.4(3)-101.6(3) by the
Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 (Cth).
54

The Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 (Cth) amendments made possible the arrests on 8 November 2005 of 15 men in Sydney and
Melbourne charged with preparing to commit a terrorist act although the actual time and location of the anticipated attack had
not yet crystallised. See Silvester J, Munro I and Gibbs S, “Enough to build 15 bombs”, Sydney Morning Herald Online
(10 November 2005), http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2005/11/09/1131407700481.html?from=top5 viewed 22 November 2005.

55
Criminal Code, ss 11.1, 11.2, 11.5. “Attempt” covers two situations: the accused “has performed acts in pursuance of the
planned crime but, before completing all the required acts, is interrupted and prevented from completing the remaining acts” or
the accused “has performed all the acts considered necessary to commit the planned crime but fails in his/her execution”.
Conspiracy is committed when two or more people agree to commit a crime. Accessorial liability exists where a person does not
agree to commit a crime but “aids, abets, counsels or procures” the commission of a crime by another person. See Brown D,
Farrier D, Egger S and McNamara L, Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process of New South
Wales (3rd ed, Federation Press, 2001) pp 1261, 1278, 1324.
56
The formulations of the outer limits of these common law crimes are not especially firm but a good example is the crime of
attempt. The Criminal Code states that a person who attempts to commit an offence is guilty of the offence of attempting to
commit that offence and is punishable as if the offence attempted had been committed (s 11.1(1)). However, for the person to be
guilty, the conduct must be more than merely preparatory (s 11.1(2)).
57

He Kaw Teh (1985) 15 A Crim R 203 extracted in Brown et al, n 55, p 385.

58

Brown et al, n 55.

59

Brown et al, n 55, p 1310.

60

Under the Criminal Code, a person who conspires with another person to commit an offence punishable by imprisonment for
more than 12 months is guilty of the offence of conspiracy to commit that offence and is punishable as if the substantive offence
had been committed (s 11.5(1)). To be convicted of conspiracy, at least two people must have made an agreement, intended to
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attempt, conspiracy and accessorial liability, as applied to the preliminary acts offences, would be
marked by the impracticability of proving mens rea which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Finally, in relation to preparatory acts, we note that overlap with the longstanding crime of
espionage, discussed below, is very limited.
Extraterritorial violence against Australians
Criminal jurisdiction over terrorist acts extends extraterritorially, as noted above.61 Where it is not
possible to prove the full political intention necessary for the mens rea of a terrorist act, then the
evidence might yet be sufficient to establish intention to commit common crimes of violence causing
death or injury. Thus, the Criminal Code Amendment (Offences Against Australians) Act 2002 (Cth)
inserted various offences in the Criminal Code relating to the murder or injury of Australians overseas.
It is now an offence for a person to engage in conduct that kills an Australian citizen or resident, where
the accused so intends, or is reckless as to causing the death.62 Similar offences exist in relation to
manslaughter,63 intentionally causing serious harm64 and recklessly causing serious harm.65 These
provisions are not counter-terror laws per se, but are apt in light of the transnational and globalised
nature of contemporary crime and given that the places where Australians have recently been victims
of terrorist acts are all extraterritorial.
Common law criminal jurisdiction is traditionally premised on locale and does not extend beyond
the limits of territory.66 The extraterritorial nature of these new offences take a big step towards
broader, nationality-based jurisdiction in Australian criminal law,67 which is based on the “passive
personality” principle accepted in international law.68 The Commonwealth Attorney-General’s written
consent is required prior to commencing this new type of proceeding.69 The new offences do not
duplicate others and are clear enough. However, the new legislation’s silence is curious concerning
attacks committed overseas causing serious damage to Australian public property or electronic
systems, in parallel with the definition of terrorist acts. Although international law would permit the
proscription of such acts on the basis of the “protective principle” of extraterritorial jurisdiction,
deliberate property damage is not covered by the new legislation.70
carry out the offence and committed an overt act pursuant to the agreement (s 11.5(2)). Often, the substantive offence and
conspiracy to do it are charged together, as the prosecution might succeed on conspiracy if unable to prove the substantive
offence (Brown et al, n 55, p 1310).
61

See n 43.
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Criminal Code, s 104.1.

63

Criminal Code, s 104.2.

64

Criminal Code, s 104.3.

65

Criminal Code, s 104.4.

66

Lipohar v The Queen (1999) 200 CLR 485; [1999] HCA 65. See also Lanham D, Cross-Border Criminal Law (Pearson
Professional, Melbourne, 1997) p 27.

67
There are other specified statutory examples, such as for terrorism, mercenary activities, child sex tourism, foreign bribery,
cybercrime, etc. However, those activities are by nature extraterritorial, whereas s 104 gives extraterritorial reach to common
crimes of violence. Australian law enforcement agencies cannot take enforcement against these offences unless the offender
enters Australian territory or the offender’s country and Australia come to a cooperative enforcement arrangement.
68
The international legitimacy of nationality-based jurisdiction is analysed in the Lotus case (Case of the ss Lotus (France v
Turkey) 4 ILR 153; PCIJ Reports Series A No 10). There, Turkey convicted a Frenchman for the death of a Turkish national
abroad on a Turkish vessel on the high seas. The case is extracted in Harris DJ, Cases and Materials on International Law
(5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1998) p 267.
69

Criminal Code, s 104.6.

70

At international law, the “protective principle” permits extraterritorial prescriptions of law to protect and secure nationals and
their property. See generally Blay S, Piotrowicz R and Tsamenyi B, Public International Law: An Australian Perspective
(Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 1997). The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), (Crimes Act) s 29, does provide for a limited
offence in respect of destroying Commonwealth property. The provision provides that any person that intentionally destroys real
or personal property of the Commonwealth or of its agencies commits an offence carrying a maximum 10-year prison term. This
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Threats and hoaxes
Less directly related to the commission of terrorist acts but associated with coercing or intimidating
the government or sections of the public, were other new offences inserted into the Criminal Code by
the Criminal Code Amendment (Anti-Hoax and Other Measures) Act 2002 (Cth). These concern using
postal services to make threats,71 hoaxes72 or send dangerous articles.73 The maximum penalty is
10 years for each offence. Postal offences already existed in Pt VIIA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
(Crimes Act), but these relate to forgery of postage stamps and the like. The relevant provisions in
State and Territory laws formed an uneven patchwork.74 The amendments sought to fill the lacunae in
the law, to provide uniform national coverage and “to specifically target those who seek to terrorise
others by exploiting their fear of terrorism”.75 There is no apparent reason to suggest that they are
unnecessary or unclear.
Parallel to offences for postal threats and hoaxes are offences for telecommunications threats and
hoaxes. The Crimes Legislation Amendment (Telecommunications Offences and Other Measures)
(No 2) 2004 (Cth) inserted these into the Criminal Code and repealed the narrower telecommunications offences in Pt VIIB of the Crimes Act.76 It creates the offences of using telecommunications
carriers to make death or hoax threats or to engage in menacing, harassing or offensive conduct.77
Whether the conduct is menacing, harassing or offensive is objectively determined.78 It was submitted
to Parliament that the additional provision for menacing, harassing or offensive conduct was
unnecessary because that conduct is already covered in the criminal law of assault.79 A weakness in
that submission is that general threats against institutions and communities would not be covered by
the law of assault, which require the identification of a specific victim.
offence does not appear to operate extraterritorially, as Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Div 15, is not expressed to apply and thus
extend the geographical jurisdiction of the offence. In light of the bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta on 9 September
2004, the Parliament should review this provision with a view to filling any lacunae in the law.
71

Criminal Code, s 471.11.

72

Criminal Code, s 471.10.

73

Criminal Code, s 471.15.

74

Other than South Australia, each State and Territory has general criminal law provisions relating to the unlawful use and
possession of explosives, see: Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 27(3)(e); Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 545E, 931H, 931I, Criminal
Code of the Northern Territory, s 253; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), ss 239, 321A, 334, 469, 470, 470A, 540, 683; Criminal Code
Act 1924 (Tas), s 181; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 317, 317A; and Criminal Code (WA), ss 312, 557, 715. There are also
provisions relating to the contamination of goods and bomb hoaxes: Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), ss 137, 138; Crimes Act 1900
(NSW), ss 93IB, 93IC, 93ID; Criminal Code of the Northern Territory, ss 134, 139, 148B, 148D; Criminal Law Consolidation
Act 1935 (SA), ss 260, 261; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), ss 287D, 287E, 287F; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 249, 250, 251,
317A. Following the 2002 anthrax scares, some States and Territories strengthened their powers to crack down on such hoaxes:
Sentencing (Emergency Services) Act 2001 (Vic); Criminal Legislation Amendment Act 2001 (NSW), Criminal Code
Amendment Act 2001 (WA), Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). The Northern Territory is still deficient. The provisions in this paragraph
have all been noted in Parliament of Australia, Bills Digest No 89 2001-02, Criminal Code Amendment (Anti-Hoax and Other
Measures) Bill 2002 (Cth), notes 7-21 and 34-36, Parliament of Australia website: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/200102/02bd089.htm viewed 15 November 2003.
75

Prime Minister John Howard, 16 October 2001, cited in Bills Digest No 89, n 74.
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It also inserted provisions concerning misuse of telecommunications carriers to commit “serious offences”, which are offences
punishable by more than five years’ imprisonment or offences against foreign laws that would be serious offences in Australia:
Criminal Code, s 471.14. See also Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 29 2004-05, Crimes
Legislation Amendment (Telecommunications Offences and Other Measures) (No 2) Bill 2004 (Cth), p 8, Parliament of Australia
website: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2004-05/05bd029.htm viewed 13 December 2005.
77

Criminal Code, s 471.15-471.17.

78

Criminal Code, s 471.17(1)(b).

79

Bills Digest No 29, n 76. It was also submitted that the objective test would render political activities on the internet illegal
insofar as they incite violence (Electronic Frontiers Australia Submission, p 9; Senator Alston, Minister for Communications,
Information Technology and the Arts and Senator Ellison, Minister for Justice and Customs, Joint Media Release 153/03,
20 August 2003, p 9).
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Participation in terrorist organisations
A major innovation in the legislative reform package was the ban on participation in terrorist
organisations. The participation offences, namely membership, directing, recruiting, supporting,
training and associating, are analysed here first and then the processes for identifying terrorist
organisations are discussed in detail. The funding offences are considered in this article under the
heading of “Acts criminalised pursuant to international conventions”.
Direction, recruitment, membership
It is an offence to intentionally direct or recruit for any terrorist organisation.80 For the directing and
recruiting offences, the prosecution must prove that the accused knew or was reckless as to whether
the organisation was a terrorist organisation.81 Proof of recklessness is a lesser evidentiary burden for
the prosecution than actual knowledge and the maximum penal terms are less than where actual
knowledge is proved. It is also an offence for a person intentionally to be a member of a terrorist
organisation.82 It is a defence in relation to membership if the accused can prove that he or she took
all reasonable steps to cease being a member as soon as he or she discovered that the organisation was
a terrorist organisation.83
The membership, direction and recruitment offences are original and do not significantly overlap
extant laws (see the discussion of conspiracy, attempt and accessories above). They apply to all
terrorist organisations and are distinct from the preparatory offences because they are not predicated at
all upon the doing of terrorist acts. In relation to their clarity, the membership offence is problematic
because it is not apparent what the indicators of membership are.84 In practice, formal membership
records (and corresponding prosecutions) are unlikely. Overlaps also occur with other new offences,
especially with the offence of “associating” with a terrorist organisation enacted two years later.
However, the membership offence applies to both organisations that are listed by regulation and those
that are not,85 generates a higher penalty than the association offence (10 years’ imprisonment as
compared to three years’)86 and bail is not available for membership, unlike associating.87
The provisions on supporting, training or associating with a terrorist organisation are structured
slightly differently, distinguishing between different ways of identifying terrorist organisations.
Support
The offence of supporting a terrorist organisation does not apply to listed terrorist organisations but is
instead limited to organisations that are actually engaged in the doing of terrorist acts. It applies in
circumstances where the accused knew or was reckless as to what the organisation was doing.88 The
provision is unique. However, the meaning and limits of “support or resources that would help the
organisation” to engage in a terrorist act are not defined and are uncertain. While the requirement of
actual knowledge as to the organisation’s engaging in terrorist acts limits the practical scope of the
provision (as actual knowledge requires clear criminal intent and is likely to be difficult to prove), the
80

Criminal Code, ss 102.2, 102.4, 102.7.

81

Criminal Code, ss 102.2(1)(c), 102.2(2)(c), 102.4(1)(c), 102.4(2)(c), 102.7(1)(c), 102.7(2)(c).

82

Criminal Code, s 102.3(1).

83

Criminal Code, s 102.3(2).

84

The definitions section for terrorist organisations (Criminal Code, s 102.1) merely “includes” as members persons who are
informal members and persons who have taken steps to become members of the organisation and, in the case of an organisation
that is a body corporate, a director or an officer of the body corporate.
85

See Criminal Code, ss 102.3 and 102.8(1)(b), respectively.

86

Criminal Code, ss 102.3 and 102.8 respectively.
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Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 15AA(2)(a). This provision was introduced as part of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2004 (Cth) legislative
package, and was the first time that the Commonwealth prescribed bail limitations for particular offences (personal
communication, Geoff MacDonald, Assistant Secretary, Criminal Justice Branch, Attorney-General’s Department, 8 February
2006).
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requirement of mere recklessness to prove mens rea does not impose the same practical limits.89 The
provision of supporting resources could occur in a very wide range of circumstances. What might the
indicators of terrorist activity be that should make a person so suspicious that it would be reckless to
provide support?90 Thus, although the new crime is practicable, it lacks certainty.
Training
The offence of intentionally providing training to or receiving training from a terrorist organisation
was inserted into the Criminal Code by the Anti-Terrorism Act 2004 (Cth).91 The full mens rea
requirement for training is met if a person is simply reckless as to whether the organisation is a
terrorist organisation.92 In addition, for listed organisations93 strict liability is imposed94 unless the
defendant proves that he or she did not actually know and was innocent of recklessness that it was a
terrorist organisation.95 The imposition of strict liability means that recklessness is presumed unless
the defendant can point to evidence that would establish a reasonable possibility that the defendant
was not reckless, following which the burden falls back to the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was indeed reckless.96 The offence of training is an original one
that does not duplicate other extant laws. That terrorist training is treated as a severe preliminary
offence is evident in the imposition of strict liability. Training in the conduct of political violence
involves a relatively limited set of potential circumstances and does not raise significant uncertainty as
to the scope of the offence. However, the unusual mens rea proof requirements in the provision are
confusingly drafted and could be reviewed to improve their simplicity.97
Associating
The Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2004 (Cth) inserted into the Criminal Code the further offence of
“associating” with terrorist organisations. It carries the lightest maximum penal term of the
participation offences, ie three years’ imprisonment.98 Not all organisations are covered – only those
that are listed by regulation.99 A person commits the offence if on two or more occasions he or she
intentionally associates with another person who is a member of, or promotes or directs, an
organisation, and the association is intended to and in fact provides support to the organisation, and
the person knows that it is a terrorist organisation. The same penalty applies when the person is
reckless as to whether it is a listed terrorist organisation, in which case strict liability applies and the
89

Actual knowledge entails a 25-year maximum sentence, as compared to 15 years for recklessness (Criminal Code, s 102.7).

90

Criminal Code, s 5.4 provides that a person is reckless: (1) with respect to a circumstance if: (a) he or she is aware of a
substantial risk that the circumstance exists or will exist; and (b) having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is
unjustifiable to take the risk; or (2) is reckless with respect to a result if: (a) he or she is aware of a substantial risk that the result
will occur; and (b) having regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take the risk.
91

Criminal Code, s 102.5.

92

Criminal Code, ss 102.5(1)(c), 102.5(4).
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The offence distinguishes between terrorist organisations listed pursuant to s 102.1(1)(a) and terrorist organisations otherwise
identified under the current s 102.1(1)(b). Section 102.5(1) states a person commits an offence if he or she intentionally provides
training to, or intentionally receives training from a terrorist organisation and the person is reckless as to whether the
organisation is a terrorist organisation. Section 102.5(2)(b) also states that a person commits an offence if, inter alia, the
organisation is a listed as a terrorist organisations by the Regulations. However, s 102.5(2) does not apply unless a person is
reckless as to the circumstances covered in s 102.5(2)(b): Criminal Code, s 102.5(4). Where s 102.5(2) is applicable, strict
liability applies to s 102.5(2)(b).
94

Criminal Code, s 13.3(3).
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Criminal Code, s 102.5(c).
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Submission of the Attorney-General’s Department to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Provisions
of the Anti-Terrorism Bill 2004 (Department of Senate, Parliament House, Canberra, May 2004) p 37.
97
The submission of the Australian Lawyers for Human Rights argued that the mens rea requirement should have required actual
knowledge, rather than recklessness, as people might unwittingly engage in training. The Senate Legal and Constitutional
Legislation Committee recommended that the provision proceed without amendment: n 96, p 39.
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Criminal Code, s 102.8(1).

99

The provisions (Criminal Code, ss 102.8(1)(b), 102.8(2)(g)) distinguish between terrorist organisations actually engaged in
terrorist acts (identified pursuant to s 102.1(1)(a)) and terrorist organisations (listed by regulation under s 102.1(1)(b)).
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defendant carries an evidentiary burden to displace the presumption of recklessness.100 There are
exceptions to the crime of associating that apply to the following categories: close family members
associating on matters of domestic or family concern;101 associations in places of worship; and
associations providing humanitarian aid and legal advice.102 There is also an exception to reflect the
implied constitutional freedom of political communication103 that might be invoked as a defence for
journalists. The burden of proving each exception claimed falls to the defendant.104 There is a similar
offence and identical punishment where a person has already been convicted of associating with a
terrorist organisation,105 apparently to circumvent arguments that an association is a continuous one
rather than repeat offending. Conversely, a person cannot be charged with the offence of terrorist
association in relation to other conduct that occurred within seven days of the conduct for which a
person was already convicted for association.106
Offences concerning criminal associations are not new to the law and have long been part of State
laws to combat consorting among petty criminals.107 However, the scope of the offence of terrorist
association is far broader than that of criminal association. The State laws on criminal association are
largely summary offences or otherwise, found in the vagrancy statutes, and are limited to punishing
the “habitual consorting” with “reputed thieves, prostitutes or persons without any visible lawful
means of support” or persons who have been convicted of indictable offences.108 Nevertheless, a
question arises as to whether the association offence is necessary, having regard to the fact that it is
already an offence to support a terrorist organisation (under Criminal Code, s 102.7) and having regard
to the broad overlap of the terms “association” and “support”.109 Yet the “support” offence in s 102.7
is distinguishable because it requires a causal link between the support and the actual doing of terrorist
acts by an organisation, rather than mere support for the existence of an organisation.110 Additional
distinctions between the crimes of support and association parallel those between membership and
association, discussed above.111
Consternation over the association offence concerned its perceived wide scope and low threshold
for proving mens rea.112 However, examination of the provisions for the offence demonstrate that it
seeks to penalise terrorist support networks but sets out appropriate exceptions and also provides
substantial thresholds for mens rea (ie intentionally associating with a listed terrorist organisation’s
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Strict liability applies if the presumption of recklessness is not displaced (Criminal Code, ss 102.8(3), 102.8(5)).
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Criminal Code, s 102.8(4)(a). The Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department expressed government reluctance to
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Committee, n 96, p 29.
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Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 6 2004-05, Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2004, Parliament of
Australia website: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2004-05/05bd006.htm viewed 19 November 2004.

108

See Bills Digest No 6, n 107, which cites the following State and Territory laws at note 17: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 564A;
Summary Offences Act (NT), ss 56-57; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA), s 13; Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas), s 6; Police Act
1892 (WA), s 65; Vagrants, Gaming and other Offences Act 1931 (Qld), s 4; and Vagrancy Act 1966 (Vic), s 6.
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For example, see submission of Mr Bret Walker SC in Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, n 96, p 21.
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The Senate Committee rejected the argument put by Commissioner Keelty, of the Australian Federal Police, that police and
court discretion are sufficient safeguards against abuse: see Submission of the Australian Federal Police in Senate Legal and
Constitutional Legislation Committee, n 96, pp 23-24. The Commissioner submitted that the associating offence did not go far
enough because terrorist groups use people from outside their membership structure in carrying out their activities.
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supporters, the association is intended to and in fact provides support to the organisation, and the
person knows or is reckless that it is a terrorist organisation). Nevertheless, the provision setting it out
needs simplification to avoid the confusion that it generates.

Identifying terrorist organisations
Procedures to properly identify a terrorist organisation, as distinct from legitimate political
organisations, were among the most difficult and debated new criminal provisions. As at May 2006,
19 terrorist organisations were listed.113
Australian-listed terrorist organisations (May 2006)
Abu Sayyaf Group (listed 14 November 2002 and re-listed 5 November 2004)
Al Qaida (listed 21 October 2002 and re-listed 1 September 2004)
Ansar Al-Islam (listed 27 March 2003 and re-listed 23 March 2005)
Armed Islamic Group (listed 14 November 2002 and re-listed 5 November 2004)
Asbat al-Ansar (listed 11 April 2003 and re-listed 11 April 2005)
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (listed 11 April 2003 and re-listed 11 April 2005)
HAMAS (military wing) (listed 9 November 2003 and re-listed 5 June 2005)
Harakat Ul-Mujahideen (now known as Jamiat ul-Ansar) (listed 14 November 2002 and re-listed
5 November 2004)
Hizbollah External Security Organisation (listed 5 June 2003 and re-listed 5 June 2005)
Islamic Army of Aden (listed 11 April 2003 and re-listed 11 April 2005)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (listed 11 April 2003 and re-listed 11 April 2005)
Jaish-I-Mohammed (listed 11 April 2003 and re-listed 11 April 2005)
Jemaah Islamiyah (listed 27 October 2002 and re-listed 1 September 2004)
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (listed 15 December 2005)
Lashkar I Jhangvi (listed 11 April 2003 and re-listed 11 April 2005)
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (listed 9 November 2003 and re-listed 5 June 2005)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (listed 34 May 2004 and re-listed 5 June 2005)
Salafist Group for Call & Combat (listed 14 November 2002 and re-listed 5 November 2004)
Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Zarqawi network) (listed 26 February 2005)
As a preliminary issue, some commentators have suggested that the provisions on listing terrorist
organisations may be unconstitutional.114 Analogy has been drawn to the Australian Communist Party
Case, where a 6-1 majority of the High Court struck down the Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950
(Cth), largely because it did not come within the scope of the defence power under s 51(vi) of the
113

The list of terrorist organisations is set out on the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department website: http://
www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/95FB057CA3DECF30CA256FAB001F7FBD?
OpenDocument viewed 15 May 2006.
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Constitution.115 As now, it was not then a time of war.116 However, the argument today seems spurious
and the defence power largely irrelevant as a sound constitutional base was established when the
States referred their counter-terrorism powers to the Commonwealth.117
As to whether it was necessary to adopt provisions to list terrorist organisations, it should be
noted that the Crimes Act also contains provisions that may be used to outlaw terrorist organisations.
Section 30A of the Crimes Act declares unlawful any “association” that directly or indirectly by its
constitution, propaganda or otherwise advocates or encourages the overthrow of the Constitution of
the Commonwealth by revolution or sabotage; the overthrow by force or violence of the established
government of the Commonwealth or of a State or of any other civilised country or of organised
government; or the destruction or injury of property of the Commonwealth or of property used in trade
or commerce with other countries or among the States. Under s 30AA, the Federal Court may declare
such an organisation unlawful on the instigation of the Attorney-General. Subsequent provisions
impose restrictions on any organisation deemed to be unlawful, including the forfeiture of its
property.118 The application of these provisions to the varied objectives of terrorist organisations
would be extremely uncertain. Given the past difficulties in applying these Crimes Act provisions at
all, it is arguable that they are redundant and should be repealed.119 The provisions in the Crimes Act
are narrowly focused and their overlap in actual application with the broader provisions of the
Criminal Code is not likely. Therefore, they do not render the new Criminal Code provisions
unnecessary.
In the reform package, three approaches to identifying a terrorist organisation were adopted under
s 102.1. A terrorist organisation is defined to include: (a) an organisation that is “directly or indirectly
engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act”; or (b) an
organisation that is specified in regulations adopted pursuant to the relevant subsections; or (c) an
organisation specifically listed in amendments to the Criminal Code. Each of these approaches is dealt
with below.
Judicial identification process
The first process for identifying a terrorist organisation, ie approach (a) above, is set out in s 102.1(a)
of the Criminal Code. It simply states that an organisation is a terrorist organisation if it is “directly or
indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act”.
However, it does not specify who determines whether the organisation is in fact “directly or indirectly
engaged in … a terrorist act”. In the event that a person is prosecuted for a terrorist act, a court is
empowered to deem any organisation that assisted in the commission of that act as a terrorist
organisation.120 The implication is that it is a court that decides that an organisation is engaged in a
terrorist act. Certainly, the meaning would be clearer if the implication and its consequences were
made explicit.
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Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1. In that case, s 4 of the Communist Party Dissolution Act
1950 (Cth) dissolved the Communist Party and provided for the forfeiture of its property. Sections 5 and 6 allowed for the
dissolution of bodies associated with Communism, subject to a declaration by the Governor-General “that the continued
existence of that body or persons would be prejudicial to the security and defence of the Commonwealth or to the execution or
maintenance of the Constitution or of the laws of the Commonwealth”.
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Dixon J stated that “only the supreme emergency of war itself would extend the operation of the [defence] power so far as
to support a legislative provision which on a subject not by its own nature within the defence power affects the status, property
and civil rights of persons nominatim”: Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 197-198. The
majority held (at 6) that the defence power may be broader in scope in times of war than in times of peace, but that the
Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950 (Cth) dealt with the dissolution of a voluntary association; subject matter that is properly
within the legislative capacity of the States.
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See n 19.
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Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 30G.
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See Douglas R, “Keeping the Revolution at Bay: the Unlawful Associations Provisions of the Commonwealth Crimes Act”
(2001) 22 Adelaide Law Review 259.
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Criminal Code, s 102.1(a). See Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 170 2002-03, Criminal Code
Amendment (Hizbollah) Bill 2003, Parliament of Australia website: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2002-03/03bd170.htm
viewed 19 May 2004.
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We note in passing that, recalling that the s 102.1(1)(a) process was one of the two ways of
identifying a terrorist organisation for the purposes of the membership offence,121 it has been argued
that s 102.5 limits the general right to free association, given that no one could ever be sure in advance
that an organisation is a terrorist one.122 To the contrary, however, in order for the membership offence
to be made out, the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew it was a terrorist organisation.
Regulatory listing
In relation to approach (b), concerning specification by regulation, there has been a history fraught by
controversy. The original 2002 Criminal Code reform package was amended. Section 102.1(2) and (4)
of the Criminal Code, as adopted in 2002, provided that organisations could be listed in regulations if
they were identified as terrorist organisations by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The
Governor-General already had a power to list these organisations by regulation under s 15 of the
Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth)123 but did not have the power under that Act to ban
these organisations and freeze their assets. There was, therefore, a gap in the law prior to 2002 in
relation to banning and freezing assets, as well as a gap before and after 2002 for listing organisations
not identified by the UNSC.
The government had wanted to be able to list organisations in the regulations independently of
whether they had been listed by the UNSC.124 For example, Hizbollah, HAMAS, Islamic Jihad, and
the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, widely regarded as terrorist organisations, are not so described by the UNSC.
The political willingness of the Security Council to ban some of these organisations is doubtful.125
The Australian Government’s aspiration to list independently of the UNSC was blocked in Parliament
due to concerns to protect the freedom of political organisation.126 The limits of the UNSC list
necessitated resorting to a clumsy third approach to listing that required Commonwealth Parliamentary
approval of any listing of additional organisations, via direct amendments to the Criminal Code.127
Consequent upon two amendments being adopted to list additional organisations in the first year of
operation of the procedure,128 the Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorist Organisations) Act 2004 (Cth)
was enacted in March 2004 to revise the process for listing by regulation.
The revised process for listing by regulation (approach (b)) now allows the Governor-General to
list by regulation terrorist organisations, on the advice of the Attorney-General, independent of the
UNSC.129 To provide such advice, the Attorney-General must be satisfied “on reasonable grounds”
that the organisation is “directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering
121

The prohibition on membership of a terrorist organisation applies to membership of organisations as declared by a court or
as listed by regulation: see Criminal Code, s 102.1(1).
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See Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Bills Digest No 120 2003-04, Anti-Terrorism Bill 2004, Parliament of
Australia website: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2003-04/04bd120.htm viewed 29 November 2004. Williams G, A Bill
of Rights for Australia (UNSW Press, Sydney, 2000) at p 18 notes that Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth
(1992) 177 CLR 106 might support a right to associate for political purposes, freedom of movement or assembly. O’Neill et al,
n 20, p 345 notes that the Commonwealth’s attempt to limit the freedom of political association may be unconstitutional
pursuant to the case law on the implied freedom of political communication. However, the right to free association has never
been guaranteed in the Australian Constitution and this area is by no means settled.
123

The provision allows the Governor-General to make regulations to ban organisations that the Security Council has listed.
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Australia, House of Representatives, Hansard, Hon Phillip Ruddock MP, Attorney-General (5 November 2003) Criminal
Code Amendment (HAMAS and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba) Bill 2003, Second Reading Speech, p 22066.
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The political and ideological turmoil manifest in Security Council decision-making obfuscates a functional approach to
combating terrorism in that forum. For example, Syria is a major sponsor of Hizbollah and was President of the Security Council
at the time the Australian Parliament acted to amend the legislation to list Hizbollah as a terrorist organisation. See Australia,
House of Representatives, Hansard, Peter Andren, MP for Calare (3 June 2003) Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorist
Organisation) Bill 2003: Cognate Bill – Criminal Code Amendment (Hizbollah) Bill 2003, Second Reading Speech, p 15816.
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the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not the terrorist act has occurred or will occur)”130 or that the
organisation “advocates” the doing of a terrorist act.131 The term “advocates” is defined as counseling
or urging, providing instruction on or directly praising the doing of a terrorist act.132 The ground of
“advocating” can be thought to detract from the clarity of this provision, due to uncertainty as to who
does the advocating and how. The Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee usefully
recommended including criteria to clarify the circumstances in which an organisation may be
considered to have advocated terrorism, ie official media releases or statements by an acknowledged
leader.133
Several safeguards increase the transparency and accountability of the regulatory listing process.
The Attorney-General must arrange for the Parliamentary Opposition Leader to be briefed in relation
to a proposed listing.134 The listed organisation itself can make an application stating a case for its
de-listing that the Attorney-General must review.135 As before, the listing is initially valid for a period
of only two years,136 but new sections provide that an organisation may be de-listed if the
Attorney-General is satisfied that it is no longer engaged in terrorist activities.137 The Joint
Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence (ASIO, ASIS and DSD) will review the new listing
procedure under approach (b) and report to both Houses of Parliament three years after the
commencement of the Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorist Organisations) Act 2004 (Cth) (ie in
2007).138
Listing by statute
In relation to approach (c), the Criminal Code allowed the specific listing of terrorist organisations if
the organisations have been specifically identified by Parliament in the Criminal Code. This approach
is now of primarily historical interest. Prior to revision of the procedure for listing by regulation, two
separate amending Acts had been passed by Parliament concerning three organisations not listed by
the Security Council. The Criminal Code Amendment (Hizbollah) Act 2003 (Cth) amended the
Criminal Code in June 2003 to include the Hizbollah External Security Organisation in the definition

Parliament of Australia website: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2002-03/03bd174.htm viewed 19 May 2004.
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Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (Department of
Senate, Parliament House, Canberra, November 2005), Recommendation 32. The Committee also sought to clarify the
connection between advocacy through praise and the actual risk of terrorism. Thus, it recommended that the definition of
“advocates” be amended to define praise to mean praising a terrorist act where such praise is likely to create a substantial risk
of a terrorist act occurring (Recommendation 31 and commentary on p 129). However, the threshold at which praise would
create a substantial risk of a hypothetical event is impossible to predetermine. It would require a court to define the point at
which it is reasonably foreseeable that extremist violence is predictable, despite the facts that extremism is not well understood
and that the predicted violence will not necessarily occur,
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Criminal Code, s 102.1(17). As to whether this Executive review should not be judicial, there is no privative clause in the
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of terrorist organisation.139 The Criminal Code Amendment (HAMAS and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba) Act
2003 (Cth) outlawed both the military wing of HAMAS and the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba organisations in
November 2003.140
That the Australian Parliament needed to pass legislative amendments to list Hizbollah, HAMAS
and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba indicates that the goverment had inadequate powers to list terrorist
organisations before the procedure for listing by regulation was revised. The detailed, apolitical
intelligence on objectives, activities and structures that is needed to keep an up-to-date list of terrorist
organisations, which frequently have multiple roles, shadow groups, particular event incarnations or
umbrella alliances, is the proper work of government.141 Parliament is ill-equipped for such vigilance
and unfortunately failed to achieve clarity in two of its three efforts. The “Hizbollah External Security
Organisation” identified in the amendment to the Criminal Code on 5 June 2003 is not considered by
experts to be a separate organisation from Hizbollah proper.142 On 7 November 2003 Parliament
similarly listed the HAMAS military wing Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, but not HAMAS, again
despite the fact that the Brigades are an integral part of HAMAS under a unified leadership.143 Both
the United States of America and Canada have banned HAMAS and Hizbollah in their entirety.144 Yet,
in both cases, Australia’s Parliament demurred to the respective organisation’s non-terrorist
activities.145 The Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) removed the HAMAS, Hizbollah and
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba organisations from the definition of terrorist organisation in the Criminal Code
because they are instead now listed as banned under the Criminal Code Regulations 2002 (Cth).146
Nevertheless, as a relic of the earlier Criminal Code ban, Hizbollah and HAMAS remain only partially
listed.
The partial listing of Hizbollah and HAMAS confounds the workability of the offences. To
illustrate, Al Manar, the global broadcasting arm of Hizbollah, through a licensed cable television
139

Criminal Code, s 102.1(1).
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It amended Pt 5.3 of the Criminal Code on 8 November 2003 to enable the Governor-General to make regulations that were
passed the following day. This was noted in a speech delivered by Attorney-General, Phillip Ruddock, at the National Forum on
the War on Terrorism and the Rule of Law (10 November 2003). Paper available from the Gilbert & Tobin Centre for Public
Law website: http://www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/Conference-Papers-National-Forum-2003.asp viewed 19 May 2004.
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that the “Governor in Council may, by regulation, establish a list on which the Governor in Council may place any entity if, on
the recommendation of the Solicitor General of Canada, the Governor in Council is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds
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or (b) the entity is knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of or in association with an entity referred to in paragraph
(a)”. The Canadian Solicitor General may only make a recommendation pursuant to subs (1) if the Solicitor General has
“reasonable grounds to believe” that the entity has acted pursuant to paras (1)(a) or (b): s 83.05(1.1). Similar legal situations
prevail in the United Kingdom, United States and New Zealand: see Bills Digest No 174, n 129.
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provided by Levitt M, Hizbollah: A Case Study of Global Reach, Remarks to the International Policy Institute for
Counter-Terrorism conference on Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios, and Future Threats, 8 September 2003 at
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www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/levitt/levitt090803.htm viewed 19 May 2004.
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viewed 19 May 2004.
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145

However, a body that engages in four regular activities, of which terrorism is only one, is a terrorist organisation, more
culpable than a person who lives 20,000 days and murders on only one of them.

146

HAMAS’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hizbollah’s External Security Organisation and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba were banned
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service, Television & Radio Broadcasting Services Australia Pty Ltd (TARBS), allegedly advertised in
Australia for donations. Money sent to Al Manar is money to Hizbollah. The Criminal Code states that
a person commits an offence when he or she intentionally or recklessly provides funding to a terrorist
organisation (whether directly or indirectly).147 Uncertainty in the interpretation of this provision as
applied to the partial listing of Hizbollah raises many pressing questions. For example, is a request by
the donor that funds be used benevolently in itself enough to avoid a finding of recklessness when
those funds can still be used to finance terrorist acts?148 This conundrum leaves a judge with a
potentially unworkable law and its application to Hizbollah still has not been resolved as at the time of
writing.149
The Criminal Code’s provisions for listing terrorist organisations are necessary, in that they do
not significantly duplicate other criminal provisions and are utile, as indicated above. It is not the aim
of this article to assess their necessity in the public policy sense. From the beginning, policy has been
argued by the majority of legal commentators such that the “practical effect of the legislation is to
deny Australians the right to politically associate with any political movements which may involve
violent struggles anywhere in the world”.150 It seems likely that this concern led to Parliament listing
only parts of Hizbollah and HAMAS (and to Parliamentary consternation over the regulatory listing of
Palestinian Islamic Jihad151) in an attempt to artificially distinguish their political activities. However,
it is ironic that legislative efforts to refine their listing have clouded the clarity of and led to
impracticability in these parts of the legislation. We suggest that, in practice, the typical public policy
risk lies not so much in which organisations are listed but more in which are not. For example, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are notably absent among Australian listed terrorist organisations.
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Criminal Code, s 102.6(1). Crimes proscribing the funding of terrorist acts and organisations are discussed below.
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The actual case of Hizbollah donations solicited in Australia through Al Manar illustrates the ongoing conundrum. On
14 November 2003 the Australian Broadcasting Authority (now the Australian Communications Media Authority (ACMA))
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the Hizbollah External Security Organisation (“Arab TV station cut for terror fund probe”, ABC News Online (14 November
2003) and Australian Broadcasting Authority news release, http://www.aba.gov.au/newspubs/news_releases/archive/2004/
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material were broadcast with the intent to solicit funds and the broadcaster was reckless as to whether or not the funds would be
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the partial listing of Hizbollah. In the event, there was insufficient evidence that TARBS had broadcast the material with the
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2004/135nr04.shtml) and TARBS withdrew the cable service before the investigation began and is now in receivership (“Bans
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Brew N, The Politics of Proscription in Australia (Parliamentary Library, Department of Parliamentary Services, Research
Note 2003-04 No 63, 21 June 2004). See also Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD,
Review of the listing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (2004) p 24. In its report on the listing, the Joint Parliamentary Committee
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Counter-terrorism orders
The Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (Cth) introduced preventative detention and control orders into
the Criminal Code. These legal orders permit the detention of terrorist suspects in order to prevent a
terrorist attack from occurring or to protect evidence relating to a terrorist act, and to permit control of
the movement and activity of persons threatening a terrorist risk. Applications for the issue of these
orders are not in themselves prosecutions for criminal offences.152 The standard of proof for obtaining
a preventative detention or control order is merely the civil standard.153 However, subsequent breaches
of the orders by persons subject to them are prosecutable offences.154 Discussion of the new
counter-counter terrorism procedural orders is included in this analysis of the new offences because
they entail relevant offences and criminal procedures.155
Preventative detention orders
An Australian Federal Police (AFP) member may apply for, and an issuing authority may issue, a
preventative detention order in relation to a person if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that: the
person will engage in a terrorist act; will possess a thing that is connected with a terrorist act; or has
done an act in preparation for a terrorist act; and making the order would substantially assist in
preventing a terrorist attack occurring.156 An order may also be made if a terrorist act has occurred
within the last 28 days and it is necessary to detain the person to preserve evidence.157 Once in force,
any police officer can detain the subject of the initial preventative detention order and it is an offence
for the person to refuse.158
There are two types of preventative detention orders: initial and continued orders. For initial
preventative detention orders, the issuing authority is a senior AFP member.159 Applications can be
made for more than one initial preventative detention order, provided that any second application
relates to a different terrorist act, or the terrorist act occurs and evidence needs to be preserved.160 An
initial preventative detention order must not exceed 48 hours, although there is provision for an
unspecified number of 24-hour extensions.161 If an initial preventative detention order is already in
force, an AFP member may apply to an issuing authority for a continued preventative detention
order.162 For continued preventative orders, the Minister for Justice may appoint as issuing authorities
152

As the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) is gradually amended, crimes proscribed in it are being shifted into the Criminal Code, so that
the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) will eventually be confined to criminal procedures and the Criminal Code to criminal offences.
However, the new counter-terrorism orders, which are procedures, were inserted into the Criminal Code to expedite the
amendment process.

153

See, eg Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 562AE, 562AI. The standard of proof requirements for obtaining preventative detention
and control orders are not new departures from the current criminal law. In New South Wales, for example, Apprehended
Violence Orders may be obtained where a person shows on the balance of probabilities that he or she has reasonable grounds to
fear. However, see the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 140, which states that, in determining whether
the standard is satisfied, that court may take into account the nature of the cause of action or defence, the nature of the
subject-matter of the proceeding, and the gravity of the matters alleged. In serious matters, the standard might be raised to be
beyond reasonable doubt. See also Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336.

154

Although cynics might suggest that a reason for the introduction of control orders was that it is easier to prove a breach of
a control order than to prove the actual offence, the respective sentences are not comparable.

155

Principled objections to preventative detention of the victims of mental disease or the perpetrators of domestic violence have
been articulated before. Although the same principled objections apply to perpetrators of terrorism, they do not affect the
necessity or clarity of the new provisions examined here.

156

Criminal Code, s 105.4(4).

157

Criminal Code, s 105.4(6).

158

Criminal Code, s 105.21(2).

159

Criminal Code, s 105.8. The definition of an “issuing authority” is set out in s 100.1(1).

160

Criminal Code, s 105.6(1).

161

Criminal Code, ss 105.9(2), 105.10(5).

162

Criminal Code, s 105.11.
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judges, federal magistrates, tribunal members or legal practitioners.163 Uncertainties as to the
constitutionality of appointing judges to issue administrative orders164 are addressed by providing that
any judicial officer who is an issuing authority is appointed in a personal capacity.165 A continued
preventative detention order must not exceed 48 hours, although again, the period may be repeatedly
extended by 48 hours.166
Prohibited contact orders are ancillary orders to prevent the detainee from contacting a family
member, parent or lawyer,167 which is otherwise permitted during preventative detention.168 A
prohibited contact order may be sought concurrently with a preventative detention order, on the same
grounds as the preventative detention order and where it “would assist in achieving the objectives of
the preventative detention order”.169 This wording has been criticised as unacceptably vague,170 a
charge that reflects concern for the detainee’s family. However, it is difficult to see how the plain
meaning could be made clearer.
The necessity for preventative detention orders might be doubted, given that a person might
simply be arrested on suspicion under extant laws. The Crimes Act specifies that a suspect may be
arrested in order to investigate whether the person committed a terrorism offence. However, the
regular investigating period for a terrorism suspect under arrest does not extend beyond four hours.171
Further, preventative detention is distinguished from investigative arrest because a person cannot be
questioned while under preventative detention.172 Instead, in order to be questioned, the detainee must
be released and then arrested in accordance with the Crimes Act173 or detained in accordance with a
163

Criminal Code, 105.2(1). Specifically, Federal Court judges and State and Territory Supreme or District Court judges, retired
judges, Federal Magistrates, Deputy Presidents or the President of the federal Administrative Appeals Tribunal, or legal
practitioners of five years’ standing.

164

Vesting judges with the administrative role of issuing authorities might be considered incompatible with their judicial
functions, which are separated from executive functions under the federal constitutional doctrine of separation of powers (set out
in R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254). The problem is highlighted by the provision of
the same protection and immunity as a High Court judge to any issuing authority who makes a continued preventative detention
order (Criminal Code, s 105.18(1)).
165

Criminal Code, s 105.18(2). In relation to judges acting as issuing authorities, it was held in Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184
CLR 348 that the appointment of judges, in their personal capacities, as issuers of interception warrants under the
Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1959 (Cth) was not incompatible with the exercise of their judicial functions. The
majority considered that interception warrants should be issued only by authorities such as judges because the authorisation of
intrusions into privacy requires impartial evaluation (at 367). A similar argument applies in the case of preventative detention
orders. Although the reasoning in the Grollo decision was narrowly divided and the majority of the High Court seems since to
have shifted towards a more restrictive position on the constitutionality of judicial exercise of Executive powers (in Wilson v
Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1), nevertheless, the Grollo precedent is on point and
likely to be determinative.
166

Criminal Code, ss 105.12(5), 105.14(6).

167

Criminal Code, s 105.14A.

168

Criminal Code, s 105.19(8).

169

Criminal Code, s 105.16.

170

See Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, n 133, p 44. The Committee recommended that the provision be
amended to elaborate on grounds for such orders (Recommendation 8).

171

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 23CA(4). For Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islanders, the investigating period is limited to two hours.
Times to be disregarded for the purposes of the investigating period include, inter alia, any time taken for the detainee to contact
friends, relatives or a lawyer (s 23CA(8)). The person may only be detained within the prescribed investigating period and must
either be released unconditionally or on bail within that period or otherwise brought before a judicial officer (s 23CA(3)). The
investigating officers may apply to a judicial officer to extend the investigating period under s 23DA. To grant the extension, the
judicial officer must be satisfied that the offence is a terrorism offence, further detention is necessary to preserve or obtain
evidence, the investigation is being conducted properly and without delay and the person has been given an opportunity to make
representations about the application (s 23DA(4)).
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Nevertheless, police may enter the detainee’s premises to effect the detention and may conduct frisk and ordinary searches
(Criminal Code, ss 105.22-105.24).
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Criminal Code, ss 105.26(1) and 105.42.
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warrant issued under s 34D of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (ASIO
Act).174 Thus, preventative detention orders are not duplicative of extant laws.
In addition to requirements for the Attorney-General’s consent and for issuing authority approval,
safeguards against abuse of preventative detention include restrictions on police action. Preventative
detention orders cannot be made for persons under 16 years of age,175 a detainee must be treated
humanely176 and must have the effect of an order explained to her or him and be given copies of it and
the grounds on which it was made.177 We suggest that the meaning of humane treatment is not clear
on the face of it and should be elaborated by a protocol specifying standards of treatment, such as
applies to ASIO detainees.178 Furthermore, it is not clear who is responsible for oversight of the
preventative detention safeguards. It has been usefully suggested that the Commonwealth Ombudsman
should take on that role (comparable to the Inspector-General of Intelligence for ASIO detention
warrants).179
Further safeguards against abuse of power seem clear enough: the detainee may contact a lawyer
for the purposes of seeking a remedy in a federal court or complaining to the Ombudsman.180 That
conversation with a lawyer is monitored,181 although it is inadmissible for evidentiary purposes and
the laws of professional legal privilege are expressly preserved.182 Unless a prohibited contact order is
in force, a detainee may contact family members and employers for the purposes of informing them
that he or she is safe183 but the detainee, the detainee’s lawyer, family members or parents of detainees
who are minors cannot disclose that the detainee is the subject of a preventative detention order.184
The Attorney-General must prepare an annual report on the operation of the preventative detention
provisions,185 which lapse in 10 years.186
174
Criminal Code, s 105.25. The character of an Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth), s 34D warrant is
different to that of a preventative detention order, primarily because it allows questioning (that is its purpose) and applies to a
broader range of persons (ie who might divulge security intelligence information) for an initial period of seven days; see Rose G
and Nestorovska D, “Terrorism and national-security intelligence laws: Assessing Australian reforms”, LAWASIA Journal, 2005,
pp 127-155.
175

Criminal Code, s 105.5. See Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, n 133, p 40.

176

Criminal Code, s 105.33.

177

Criminal Code, s 105.29. Failure to do so means the police officer may commit an offence (s 105.45). However, it has been
submitted that nothing less than the full statement of reasons should be provided to the subject of the order in the interests of
procedural fairness (see submission of Bret Walker SC, n 109; Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, n 133,
Recommendation 7).

178

A Protocol has been developed in relation to the treatment of detainees under ASIO warrants: see AttorneyGeneral Daryl Williams AM QC MP, ASIO Protocol to Guide Warrant Process, Press release, 12 August 2003, available from
Attorney-General’s website: http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/attorneygeneralhome.nsf/Page/Media_Releases_2003_August_
2003_ASIO_Protocol_to_guide_warrant_process_(12_August_2003) viewed 5 August 2005. See also Senate Legal and
Constitutional Legislation Committee, n 133, Recommendation 10 and comments by Professor McMillan, the Commonwealth
Ombudsman, Ian Carnell and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security in Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee, p 40.
179

Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, n 133, Recommendation 9.

180

Criminal Code, s 105.37.

181

A proposition that the Law Council of Australia described as an “anathema to a system of justice which depends in significant
part on the sacrosanct nature of client/lawyer communications”, cited in Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee, n 133, p 50.

182

Criminal Code, ss 105.38(1), 105.38(5), 105.50.

183

Criminal Code, s 105.35. These restrictions on communication have been criticised as oppressive because the subject should
be allowed to give “instructions solely for the running of a legitimate business” or other family commitments (Human Rights
and Equal Opportunity Commission Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, n 133, p 45).

184

Criminal Code, s 105.41.

185

Criminal Code, s 105.47.

186

Criminal Code, s 105.53. However, there is no provision for earlier periodic review. Recommendations have been made that
the division be reviewed, regularly reported on and lapse after five years (Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee, n 133, Recommendations 16, 17, 18).
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A privative clause deprives a prospective detainee of opportunity to contest the application for an
initial or continued preventative detention order, other than in the High Court, which has a judicial
review jurisdiction guaranteed under the federal Constitution.187 Complaints during detention can be
made to the Commonwealth Ombudsman, who can make only recommendations to the relevant
authorities.188 The Administrative Appeals Tribunal can award post hoc compensation to those
wrongly detained,189 as can a federal or State court, but neither can do so while an order under
Commonwealth law is in force.190
Control orders
A control order can impose prohibitions, restrictions and other requirements upon a person’s activities.
The terms may include restrictions and prohibitions on movement, leaving Australia, associating with
certain individuals, using certain forms of technology, and possessing or using certain articles. They
may also include requirements to wear tracking devices, report to specified persons at specified times
and places, be photographed and fingerprinted and participate in counseling or other services.191 It is
an offence to contravene a control order, liable to a maximum of five years’ imprisonment.192
Control orders are not duplicative of other extant Commonwealth laws. They have been likened to
apprehended violence orders (AVOs) but they are nonetheless distinct in function and form.193 For
example, if a person trained with a terrorist organisation prior to that training becoming an offence
(ie they are innocent of the current offence under Commonwealth law), their transfer of expertise to
others under the guise of recreational shooting or war games conducted on outback cattle stations194
might be usefully obstructed by control orders. Thus, even though they are not actually engaged in
violent acts, their use of firearms or travel to such stations can be restricted.
The control order provisions, set out in Div 104 of the Criminal Code, are generally clear.
However, minor deficiencies are noted below. The procedures for issuing control orders vary with
their three types: “urgent” and “interim”, each of which is subject to judicial confirmation in order to
become a “continuing” control order. A senior member of the AFP may apply195 to the Family Court,
Federal Court or Federal Magistrates Court (the “issuing court”)196 for an interim control order,
subject to the Attorney-General’s written consent.197 The use of a federal court for the issue of an
executive order raises legal uncertainties concerning the separation of judicial and executive powers
that are inherent in current constitutional law, as has been noted above.198
187

Constitution, s 75(v) guarantees access to the courts where a person may seek a writ of habeas corpus or rely on the common
law principles of judicial review of executive decisions. See Ruddock v Vadarlis [2001] FCA 1329.

188

Criminal Code, s 105.36.

189

Criminal Code, s 105.51(4) and (7).

190

Criminal Code, ss 105.51(2), 105.52.

191

Criminal Code, s 104.5. Fingerprinting and photographing must be carried out in accordance with s 104.22.

192

Criminal Code, s 104.27.

193

Apprehended violence orders are dealt with under federal, State and Territory laws. The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 114(1)
utilises injunctions to protect persons or property in a marriage and s 60D uses the term “family violence orders”, defined as
orders made under State and Territory law to protect a person from family violence.

194

Such a situation is believed to have occurred: see Baker J, Cubby B and Timms A, “Jihad camps held in bush, police say”,
Sydney Morning Herald (15 November 2005), http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/jihad-camps-held-in-bush-police-say/
2005/11/14/1131951099035.html viewed 13 December 2005.
195

For both urgent and interim control orders, the AFP member must consider on reasonable grounds that the control order
would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act, or suspect on reasonable grounds that the person has provided training to
or received training from a listed terrorist organisation (Criminal Code, s 104.2(2)).

196

Criminal Code, s 104.3(1) and proposed new definition of “issuing court” in s 100.1(1).

197

Criminal Code, s 104.2(1). The procedure to be followed is outlined in accordance with s 104.2(2). For the making of an
urgent control order, the AFP member may dispense with the Attorney-General’s consent for up to four hours from making the
request (ss 104.6(2), 104.6(10)).

198

©

See n 187.

44

(2007) 31 Crim LJ 20

Australian counter-terrorism offences: Necessity and clarity in federal criminal law reforms

The issuing court may grant an interim order where the AFP member has requested it in
accordance with specified requirements199 and the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities,
that making the order would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act or that the person has
provided training to or received training from a listed terrorist organisation, and the court is also
satisfied on the balance of probabilities that each of controls requested is reasonably necessary, and
reasonably appropriate and adapted,200 taking into account the impact on the person’s circumstances.201 Where an interim or urgent control order has been made, the order must specify the date on
which the person who is the subject of the order may attend court where the order will be confirmed,
voided or varied.202 This provision could be more specific as to time limits within which the
confirmation hearing should take place.203 The Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee
usefully recommended that the provision expressly require the day of the confirmation hearing to be
set as soon as reasonably practicable after the interim or urgent order has been made.204
In addition to the checks and balances of the Attorney-General’s consent and issuing authority
approval and confirmation, are other safeguards against abuse of power. Interim control orders cannot
be issued for persons under 16 years of age.205 The AFP member commits an offence if the draft
request to the Attorney-General is false or misleading.206 Any photographs or fingerprints taken under
the terms of a control order must be destroyed 12 months after the control order ceases to be in force,
if new proceedings in respect of the control order have not been brought, or have been completed or
discontinued.207 To ensure that the subject has sufficient notice to attend a court considering
confirmation, the AFP member must personally serve the interim or urgent order, together with a
summary of the grounds on which it was made as well as information on its effect and the period for
which it is in force, and ensure that the person understands the information provided.208 However, a
failure to comply with this requirement does not invalidate the control order,209 which, of course,
undermines the effectiveness of that safeguard requirement. The Attorney-General is to report to
199

Criminal Code, s 104.3.

200

Criminal Code, s 104.4(1).

201

Criminal Code, s 104.4(2). It was suggested that, in addition to requiring that the order be reasonably appropriate and
adapted taking into account the person’s circumstances, a further proportionality test should require that the order be in the least
restrictive terms for achieving the purpose of the order (Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, n 133,
Recommendation 19). If incorporated, the additional test would have increased the discretion available to the issuing court to
safeguard the detainee’s interests but it would have diminished the certainty of the provision. For urgent orders, the court must
also be satisfied that the order should be made urgently (Criminal Code, s 104.7(2)). Where an urgent control order is granted,
the AFP member must submit within 24 hours a form of order, information or explanation on the necessity of the order that has
been duly sworn or affirmed, together with a copy of the Attorney-General’s consent (ss 104.6(4) and (5), 104.7(5)). If the
Attorney-General does not give consent within 24 hours, then the urgent control order ceases to have force (s 104.10(2)).

202

Criminal Code, s 104.5(1)(e).

203

This is a concern particularly given the ex parte nature of the interim and urgent control order issuing processes. See
submissions of Human Rights Office, Professor Charlesworth, Professor Byrne and Ms Mackinnon to Senate Legal and
Constitutional Legislation Committee, n 133, p 65.

204

Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, n 133, Recommendation 20. If the person concerned or their
representative does not appear in court at the confirmation, the court may confirm the order without variation if satisfied that it
was properly served (Criminal Code, s 104.14(4)). Confirmed control orders have a maximum term of 12 months after the day
on which the interim order is made, but there is no limitation on the number of repeat orders that can be made once the
12-month time period expires (s 104.5(1)(f)) and Castan Centre for Human Rights Submission to the Senate Legal and
Constitutional Legislation Committee, n 133.
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Criminal Code, s 104.28.

206

Criminal Code, ss 137.1-137.2.
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Criminal Code, s 104.22(2). Additionally, the photographs and fingerprints must be used only for the purpose of ensuring
compliance with the control order and a failure to comply with this provision is an offence (s 104.22(1), (3)).

208

Criminal Code, s 104.12(1).

209

Criminal Code, s 104.12(4).
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Parliament each year on the operation of the control orders and the operative part of the Criminal
Code (Div 104), which is set to lapse in 10 years.210 These provisions appear clear.
At the confirmation hearing, the person may be legally represented and there are provisions
allowing the representing lawyer to obtain a copy of the order as well as a summary of grounds.211
The Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee recommended that the issuing court
provide full rather than summary reasons for its decision to grant an interim or urgent order.212 A full
statement of reasons would ensure conformity with the applicable principles of procedural fairness and
would facilitate judicial review.213 Although full reasons are preferable, they would be subject to
excisions for reasons of national security in accordance with the National Security Information
(Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth). As the court need only be satisfied that the control
order would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act, or that the person subject to it has
provided training to or received training from a listed terrorist organisation,214 it seems that there
would be little difference between a coherent summary and heavily censored full reasons.

Acts criminalised pursuant to international conventions
A diverse range of terrorist acts are proscribed pursuant to treaties to which Australia is a party – a
suite of them since 2002. There are 13 United Nations treaties that pertain to combating terrorism.
Three mandate measures to prevent terrorist acts.215 Ten were negotiated to respond to a particular
type of terrorist act, all except one after the incidents took place, by cooperating to punish perpetrators
of the specified violent crimes. The types of terrorist acts that the treaties respond to are: attacks on
protected persons;216 hostage taking;217 hijacking of aircraft;218 unlawful acts of violence against civil
aircraft and airports and offences on aircraft;219 unlawful acts of violence against ships and against
platforms at sea;220 bombings of public places;221 and nuclear attacks.222

210

Criminal Code, s 104.32.

211

Criminal Code, s 104.21.

212

Senate and Legal Constitutional Committee, n 133, Recommendation 20. It also recommended placing an obligation on AFP
officers to arrange access to a lawyer or interpreter where the subject of the control order would have difficulty understanding its
effect due to language barriers or mental or physical incapacity (Recommendation 21) although this recommendation was not
taken up.

213

See also submission of Bret Walker SC, n 109.

214

These are the matters as to which an issuing court must be satisfied under proposed new s 104.4(1).

215

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1980 [1987] ATS 16, which entered into force for Australia on
22 October 1987; Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 1991, Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, Select Documents on International Affairs No 39 (1991) 3 (AGPS, Canberra, 1995) p 28; International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 [2002] ATS 23, which came into force for Australia on
26 October 2002.

216

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic
Agents 1973 [1977] ATS 18.

217

International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979 [1990] ATS 17.

218

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970 [1972] ATS 16.

219

Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 1963 [1970] ATS 14; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1971 [1973] ATS 24; Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation 1988 [1990] ATS 39.
220

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 [1993] ATS 10; Protocol
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf 1988 [1993] ATS
11.

221

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997 [2002] ATS 17.

222

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (New York, 14 April 2005), available from United
Nations website http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp (viewed 15 May 2006).
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Treaties relevant to terrorist acts that Australia had ratified prior to its anti-terrorism legislative
reforms in 2002 were already implemented by legislation. The agreed offences are tightly constrained
by the treaties and the language of the implementing legislation reflects a careful, technical approach
to their implementation:
• The Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991 (Cth) implements the four treaties listed in its Schs 1-4: the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970, the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation 1971, the Protocol on the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving Civil Aviation 1988 and the
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 1963.223
• The Crimes (Ships and Fixed Platforms) Act 1992 (Cth) implements the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 and the Protocol
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf 1988, listed in its Schs 1-2.224
• The Crimes (Hostages) Act 1989 (Cth) implements the International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages 1979.225
• The Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act 1976 (Cth) implements the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents 1973.226
• The Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 (Cth) implements the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1980.227
Thus, Australia had already ratified and enacted its obligations under nine of the 13 multilateral
treaties, but not the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997, the
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 1991228 and the
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999.229 The Plastic Explosives
Convention entered into force on 21 June 1998 and the International Convention for the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism adopted on 13 April 2005 has not yet entered into force. These are the
only United Nations counter-terrorism treaties not ratified by Australia.230
Terrorist bombings
The Commonwealth Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression of Terrorist Bombings) Act 2002 (Cth)
amended the Criminal Code to give effect to the International Convention for the Suppression of
223
Conventions cited at nn 218 and 219. The States and Territories have their provisions relating to aircraft offences: Crimes Act
1900 (ACT), ss 27(3)(g), 120; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 204-209; Criminal Code of the Northern Territory of Australia,
ss 180, 191, 216-217, 244-245, 248, 443; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), ss 319A, 338A, 408A, 417A, 467A; Aircraft Offences
Act 1971 (SA); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), ss 276A-276G; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 80, 246A, 246B, 246E, 263A, 269;
Criminal Code (WA), ss 711A, 565A, 294A, 451A, 390B.
224

Conventions cited at n 220. Offences occurring at sea are governed by a myriad of Commonwealth, State and Territory
arrangements, as well as general criminal laws relating to murder, assault, destruction of property etc. For example, see Crimes
at Sea Act 2000 (Cth); Crimes at Sea Act 1998 (NSW); Criminal Law (Offences at Sea) Act 1978 (NT); Crimes at Sea Act 2001
(Qld); Crimes at Sea Act 1998 (SA); Crimes at Sea Act 1999 (Tas); Crimes (Offences at Sea) Act 1978 (Vic); Crimes at Sea Act
2000 (WA). Some States and Territories have specific criminal law provisions relating to ships: Crimes Act 1900 (ACT),
ss 27(3)(g) and 120 can also apply to ships; Criminal Code of the Northern Territory, ss 180, 242-243; Criminal Code 1899
(Qld), s 469 generally; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), s 270; Criminal Code (WA), s 565A.
225

Convention cited at n 217.

226

Convention cited at n 216.

227

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1980 [1987] ATS 16, which entered into force for Australia on
22 October 1987.

228
Select Documents on International Affairs, n 215. See also Status of MEX Convention, International Civil Aviation
Organisation website: http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/MEX.htm viewed 30 November 2004.
229

Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, n 215.

230

Select Documents on International Affairs, n 215. The Convention obliges parties to: prohibit and prevent the manufacture of
unmarked plastic explosives within their territories; establish effective control over their possession and transfer; prevent the
unauthorised movement of unmarked plastic explosives into or out of their territory; and ensure that any unmarked plastic
explosives that are not held by military or police bodies are destroyed or consumed.
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Terrorist Bombings 1997, thus enabling its ratification.231 The legislation created offences relating to
international terrorist activities using explosive or lethal devices, for which the offender could face life
imprisonment. Section 72.3 of the Criminal Code now provides that it is an offence to place a bomb in
a public place or outside a government facility with the intention of causing death or serious harm.
Under Art 6(1) and (2) of the Convention, the bombing must be subject to the jurisdiction of more
than one State.232 Therefore, the offence, as defined in s 72.4(2) of the Criminal Code, applies only if
it cannot be classed as wholly internal to Australia.
Prior to the new bombing provisions, the Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act
1971 (Cth) already related to the offences of possessing, discharging or throwing a weapon, missile or
other noxious substance at or in the vicinity of Commonwealth, Federal Court and diplomatic or
consular premises. However, that Act is largely concerned with offences such as trespassing, willful
damage and obstruction and does not extend to serious crimes like murder. Nor does the earlier Act
extend to bombing acts committed entirely extraterritorially. That lacuna could prevent Australia and
other countries that require dual criminality in extraditions from cooperating to extradite offenders.
Further, although the general extraterritorial criminalisation of terrorist acts introduced in 2002 under
s 101 of the Criminal Code overlaps the new bombing provisions, the latter were necessary to
implement the specific cross-jurisdictional requirements of the international treaty.
Financing terrorist acts
The financing of terrorism offences can be conceptually divided into two categories: financing terrorist
acts and financing terrorist organisations. The Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act 2002
(Cth) inserted a financing of terrorist acts into the Criminal Code to implement the Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999. A person commits an offence, risking life
imprisonment, if he or she provides or collects funds and the person is reckless as to whether the funds
will be used to facilitate a terrorist act.233 The Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) inserted an
additional provision that a person is guilty of an offence, again carrying a penalty of life
imprisonment, for intentionally making funds available to another person or collecting funds for or on
behalf of another person, in circumstances where the first person is reckless as to whether the second
person will use those funds to facilitate or engage in a terrorist act.234 The newer offence captures
circumstances where a person recklessly provides funds indirectly, such as through a fundraiser or
other intermediary.235 It is questionable whether the earlier provision’s wording on “providing” funds
could achieve the same outcome and, therefore, the amendment enhances the clarity of the offence of
providing funds through an intermediary.
A separate offence of funding a terrorist organisation is committed if a person intentionally
receives funds from or makes them available to an organisation, reckless as to whether it is a terrorist
organisation.236 This offence is distinct from that of funding terrorist acts because no terrorist act is
required but merely the step of providing funds to or receiving funds from an organisation. There has
been one conviction under this offence, for receiving funds from Al Quaeda.237 The Anti-Terrorism Act
(No 2) 2005 (Cth) extended this offence to cover circumstances where a person collects funds as an
intermediary for a terrorist organisation, reckless as to whether it is a terrorist organisation.238 The
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terrorist organisation funding provision can be compared to the Crimes Act, which provides that it is
an offence to “give or contribute money or goods” or to “receive or solicit subscriptions or
contributions of money or goods” for an unlawful association.239 However, as noted above, the
provisions concerning unlawful associations under the Crimes Act apply to a different class of
organisations from those under the Criminal Code.240

Offences against government
A set of extant crimes proscribe acts seeking to undermine government: mercenary activities, sedition,
espionage, sabotage, treason and treachery. Some of these have been recently updated to meet
contemporary counter-terrorism challenges. Others, although reviewed by Sir Harry Gibbs in 1991,241
have not been revised and so they remain broad and archaic, overlapping awkwardly with new
counter-terrorism offences.
Mercenary activities
The Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978 (Cth) (Foreign Incursions Act) makes it
an offence for Australian citizens to attack a foreign government. This is defined as intending to
engage, and actually to engage, in hostile activities in foreign states, including violently overthrowing
a foreign government; armed hostilities; causing death or bodily injury to a head of state or a public
person; or unlawfully destroying or damaging property belonging to a foreign government.242 It is a
defence if the person was serving “in any capacity in or with” the armed forces of a foreign state or
other armed forces for which a Ministerial declaration is in force.243 The Anti-Terrorism Act 2004
inserted a provision to prevent that defence from applying to persons engaged in armed hostilities
while serving in the armed forces of a proscribed organisation.244 Proscribed organisations are those
listed by regulation as terrorist organisations or those listed under regulations pursuant to the Foreign
Incursions Act .245
The necessity of the amendment to the defence was debated in the Senate Legal and
Constitutional Legislation Committee, given the extraterritorial application of the definitions of
“terrorist act” and “organisation” and the new offences relating to harming Australians while
overseas.246 The Senate Committee ultimately accepted the Attorney-General’s submission that,
although there is an overlap in laws concerning terrorist acts or organisations and foreign incursions,
the amendment was necessary to close a loophole available to persons engaged in armed hostilities
where the terrorist organisation is also an instrument of the State.247 The Bosnian Serbian army, the
Taliban and Hizbollah are examples of such organisations.
In order to proscribe an organisation, the Act currently provides that the Minister must be satisfied
on reasonable grounds that the organisation is directly or indirectly engaged in planning, preparing,
assisting in or fostering serious human rights violations, armed hostilities against the Commonwealth
or its allies, a terrorist act or any act prejudicial to the security, defence or international relations of the
Commonwealth.248 Reflecting concern as to the adequacy of these criteria for proscribing
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organisations under the Foreign Incursions Act,249 the Committee recommended that further criteria
be developed.250 Indeed, the wide breadth of some of the existing criteria, such as prejudicing the
international relations of the Commonwealth, would benefit from the development of guidelines to
clarify their application.
Sedition
The Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) repealed the then extant crime of sedition in the Crimes
Act251 and updated it with a new crime in the Criminal Code.252 Under the new Criminal Code
sedition provisions,253 the common element running through the offence is the urging of unlawful
force or violence. A person commits an offence punishable by seven years’ imprisonment for urging
the use of force or violence to overthrow the Constitution or government or to interfere in
Parliamentary elections; urging violence between community groups;254 or urging a person to assist
the enemy;255 or to assist others engaged in armed hostilities against the Australian Defence Forces.256
It applies whether the offender is deliberate or reckless as to the factual circumstances prevailing
(eg as to whether the Australian Defence Forces would be affected). The offence applies
extraterritorially257 and the Attorney-General’s consent is required to commence prosecution.258
In reviewing the offences, the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee (and
several submissions to it) welcomed the attempt to revise and modernise the Crimes Act sedition
provisions.259 However, many submissions to the Committee questioned the necessity of sedition laws
per se, given that the extant incitement to violence provisions in the Criminal Code260 could be
applied to offences, such as treason and treachery, allegedly to the same effect.261 Nevertheless,
treason and treachery laws (examined below) are narrowly focused on the overthrow of government
and do not address the broader urging of public violence that the revised crime of sedition does.
Sedition does completely overlap with incitement to commit terrorism offences. But, it also extends
beyond incitement to commit specific extant offences, to include urging persons to engage in the
249

See submission of Castan Centre for Human Rights Law in Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, n 96, p 27, which
argued for restraints on regulatory power. The Attorney-General’s Department submitted that this was not necessary as the
organisation need not be a terrorist organisation to be listed under the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978
(Cth) and that a crime is only committed once a person engages in armed hostilities (pp 27-28).

250

Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, n 96, p 33 and Recommendation 4.49.

251

Under the previous version of the sedition crime, seditious intention was defined as an intention to bring the Sovereign into
hatred or contempt, excite disaffection against the government or Constitution of the Commonwealth or against either House of
the Parliament of the Commonwealth, excite people to attempt to procure the alteration by unlawful means of any matter in the
Commonwealth established by law of the Commonwealth, or promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes
of people so as to endanger the peace, order or good government of the Commonwealth (Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 24). A
seditious enterprise (s 24B) could be punished by up to three years of imprisonment (s 24C).

252

The definition of unlawful associations in the Crimes Act was also amended so that the meaning of seditious intention used
to identify an unlawful association in the Crimes Act would be consistent with the new crime of sedition in the Criminal Code.
An unlawful association is declared to be a body that advocates or encourages the doing of any act having or purporting to have
as an object the carrying out of a seditious intention (Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 30A).

253

Criminal Code, s 80.2.

254

Community groups means those distinguished by race, religion, nationality or political opinion.

255

The enemy is defined as an organisation or country that is at war with the Commonwealth or otherwise specified as an enemy
by s 80.1(1)(e).

256

The latter two limbs do not apply to engagement in conduct for the purposes of providing humanitarian aid.

257

Criminal Code, s 80.4.

258

Criminal Code, s 80.5.

259

See Saul B, of the Gilbert and Tobin Centre for Public Law, Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee Report,
n 133, pp 77, 114.

260

Criminal Code, s 11.4.

261

For example Saul B, of the Gilbert and Tobin Centre for Public Law, in the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee Report, n 133, p 87. See Criminal Code, s 80.1 (treason); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 24AA (treachery).

©

50

(2007) 31 Crim LJ 20

Australian counter-terrorism offences: Necessity and clarity in federal criminal law reforms

general categories of political violence set out in the sedition provisions.262 Overall, it is apparent that
there are multiple overlaps among criminal laws applicable to urging others to do illegal violence, but
that the laws are not all identical. In relation to the necessity of the offence of sedition, it is of broader
application to the urging of political violence than are extant laws and it is more generally applicable
in the contemporary context, where electronic media can easily be used to foment political violence
across an infinitely wide rage of possibilities.
It is a defence to the crime of sedition if the acts were done in good faith, as set out in broad
described circumstances. These circumstances occur where a person, in good faith, seeks to show that
government advice, policies or actions are in error; points out (with a view to reform) the defects of
the government, Constitution or administration of justice; urges another person to act lawfully in
procuring change; points out issues causing tensions between rival groups with a view to removing
those issues; or does anything in connection with an industrial dispute.263 Proof of mens rea would be
impossible in these described circumstances and, thus, the defence is superfluous, other than the
cosmetics of explicitly repeating the mens rea applicable to the offence.
Concerning the clarity of the sedition offence, it has been argued that the term “urge” is vague and
makes the scope of the offence uncertain,264 possibly capturing legitimate academic and journalistic
commentary, satire, comedy and artistic expression.265 Consequently, the Senate Legal and
Constitutional Legislation Committee recommended that the fault element in “urging” be expressly
intentional,266 rather than merely reckless urging; that defences include actions for journalistic,
educational, artistic, scientific, religious or public interest purposes; and that the words “in good faith”
be removed as a qualifier of the defences.267 However, the offence already requires that urging to
violence be intentional. Recklessness relates merely to the urging person’s adequate understanding of
the contextual circumstances in which urging occurs.268 Further, a broad unqualified defence for
actions for journalistic, educational, artistic, scientific, religious or public interest purposes would
render the offence nugatory, as would allowing actions said to give rise to the defences to be made not
in good faith.
Unfortunately, the brief time allowed for the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee’s work and for the preparation of submissions to it lowered the quality of its
considerations.269 In fairness, the Committee’s first recommendation on the sedition provisions was
that they be excised and that the matter be referred to the Australian Law Reform Commission for
fuller consideration.270 It is a cause for regret that the truncated process of Committee scrutiny for the
Anti-Terrorism Bill 2005, which was the product of governmental management of the legislative
agenda, impacted on the quality of parliamentary consideration of legislation of wide concern to the
Australian community.
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Concerns were expressed that the offences would breach the implied constitutional right to
freedom of political communication by stifling free speech.271 The Attorney-General’s Department
received advice that the provisions pose no constitutional issues in respect of freedom of political
communication.272 Nevertheless, specific provision that the offences do not apply to the extent that
they inhibit any such freedom would provide an additional safeguard.273
In November 2005, the Attorney-General acknowledged the need for further and deeper
consideration of the sedition provisions following their enactment274 and the matter was referred to the
Australian Law Reform Commission in March 2006.275 It follows that the government assessed the
need for the sedition provisions to come into effect at the time as more urgent and weighty than the
need to refine the provisions. The Australian Law Reform Commission produced a discussion paper in
May with a final report due in December 2006.276 In essence, the discussion paper confirmed that the
reforms were necessary and not duplicative but suggested a range of changes that clarify, simplify and
“beautify” the legislation. These include renaming the sedition offence as “offences against political
liberty and public order”, stating expressly that urging to violence must be intentional and, conversely,
removing the superfluous defence of good faith, although the listed good faith factors may instead be
taken into account in sentencing. Substantive recommendations on policy matters that sought to refine
the scope of the legislation included that the offence of sedition be limited to Australian nationals or
residents and that the offences of urging a person to assist the enemy or others engaged in armed
hostilities against the Australian Defence Forces be repealed.
Treason and treachery
The long-standing offence of treason under the Criminal Code potentially overlaps terrorism
offences.277 It is an offence of treason to cause the death of the Sovereign, the Sovereign’s heir or
consort, the Prime Minister or the Governor-General. It is also an offence to harm, or in any way
imprison them, to wage war against the Commonwealth, or intentionally engage in conduct that assists
its enemies.278 Further, it is an offence to assist anyone who has committed treason with the intention
of allowing that person to escape punishment. It is also an offence to know that a person intends to
commit treason and to fail to inform the police of that person’s treasonous activities.279 The treason
provisions were amended in the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (No 2) (Cth),
which moved it from the Crimes Act to the Criminal Code. As for sedition, the changes allowed
extraterritorial jurisdiction,280 subject to the Attorney-General’s consent,281 and defences for specified
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actions in good faith.282 The Australian Law Reform Commission has usefully proposed that the
meaning of “assistance” to an enemy be clarified by confining its meaning from “any means
whatever” to “material” assistance.283
The Crimes Act deals with treachery, which overlaps with but is narrower than treason under the
Criminal Code. The Crimes Act provides that it is an offence of treachery to do any act with the intent
of overthrowing the Constitution of the Commonwealth by revolution or sabotage.284 Thus, treachery
focuses on overthrow of the Constitution, while treason focuses on attacks on State leaders. Assisting
enemies of the Commonwealth is a treacherous offence, similar to treason under the Criminal Code.285
However, unlike the Criminal Code, the Crimes Act requires that the enemies of the Commonwealth
must be specified by proclamation.286 Safeguards provide that certain acts carried out in good faith,
such as political rallies attempting to bring about legislative change through lawful means, are not
unlawful.287
The treachery provisions were not amended as a part of the legislative package to address terrorist
acts and they are neither so clear nor comprehensive as the definitions of terrorist acts.
Recommendations for their amendment have been outstanding since the 1991 Gibbs Review of
Commonwealth Criminal Law. Since the enactment of the terrorist act offences, the parts of the extant
treason and treachery offences, other than those that deal with armed conflict, war, enemies and
invasion, have become redundant.288
Espionage
The Criminal Code Amendment (Espionage and Related Matters) Act 2002 (Cth) inserted a 25-year
penalty for a person convicted of espionage into the Criminal Code.289 The provision states that a
person commits the offence if he or she makes available information concerning the Commonwealth’s
security or defence or reveals information concerning the security or defence of another country. The
fact that the information is lawfully available is a defence.290 The act must result in, or be likely to
result in the information being communicated to foreign country or to a foreign organisation.291
The espionage provision overlaps with the general proscriptions on making documents to
facilitate terrorist acts or planning or preparing a terrorist act in instances where the espionage is to
gather information for the purpose of a terrorist act.292 An additional overlapping layer of offences is
set out in the Crimes Act. Part VI of the Crimes Act deals with offences relating to the disclosure of
sensitive information by Commonwealth officers and Pt VII creates offences relating to the disclosure
of official secrets and unlawful soundings.293 The overlapping ranges of activities covered by the
espionage and unlawful disclosure offences and the terrorism related offences are far from identical.
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For example, terrorist act preparations and documents may be made without obtaining unlawful
disclosures or security and defence information. However, the ways that these and the espionage
offences articulate with the offences of making documents facilitating terrorist acts, or planning or
preparing terrorist acts, is partly duplicative. Revision of the espionage offence could clarify their
relationship.
Sabotage
The offence of sabotage is essentially limited to causing damage to a narrow set of Australian Defence
Force targets. Under the Crimes Act, an act of sabotage is the destruction, damage or impairment, with
the intention of prejudicing the safety or defence of the Commonwealth, of any article used or
intended to be used either by the Defence Force; in connection with the manufacture, investigation or
testing of weapons or apparatus of war; for the defence of the Commonwealth; or that is in or forms
part of a place that is a Commonwealth prohibited place.294 These form only a small subset of targets
available to terrorists and are unlikely choices as they are “hard”, even if “high profile” targets.
Conversely, the mens rea element required in the sabotage offence is premised on intention to do the
act and does not include the extra intentional elements required in a terrorist act (ie coercing or
intimidating the government or intimidating sections of the public). Thus, the overlap between the two
categories of offences is very limited and the crime of sabotage is not made redundant.

CONCLUSION
This article’s assessment of the counter-terrorism reforms against the criteria of necessity and clarity
indicates that the new criminal offences were necessary to update or extend prior legislation but that
most prior legislation remains on the books, overlap occurs and that in several of the new provisions
clarity is lacking. Shortcomings in prior legislation prohibiting acts of political violence included a
lack of extraterritorial reach, inadequate proscription of preparatory and supporting activities, inability
to prohibit participation in terrorist organisations, non-implementation of applicable treaties,
inadequate applicable penalties and inadequate incitement laws. Not least in these prior shortcomings
was the lack of a legal definition for terrorism in the context of globally networked political violence.
The 2002 reforms gave terrorism a sound contemporary legal definition. An anomaly in the
definition’s safeguard for legitimate political activism is that unintended damage to property or
electronic systems is not exempted from the definition of a terrorist act. Additionally, the definition’s
extraterritorial application fails specifically to exempt legitimate military operations conducted in
accordance with international law.
The definition provides a toolbox within which are placed offences with more severe penalties
than correlated common violent crimes. These include terrorist acts, preliminary acts supportive of
terrorist acts and participation in terrorist organisations. Although remoteness at the extremities of the
range of preparatory acts is undefined, the difficulty of establishing criminal intention will correctly
define the limits of remote acts. Curiously, the new provisions on extraterritorial violence against
Australians do not address attacks committed overseas causing serious damage to Australian public
property or electronic systems, in parallel with the definition of terrorist acts. The initial provisions on
participation in terrorist organisations were a weak point in the reforms, being partly unworkable, but
have been amended with little remaining damage, other than the two unworkable listings adopted by
Parliament in 2003. (Indeed, the main public policy risk in the terrorist organisation listing process
would seem to be improper exclusion rather than inclusion.) Concerning identification of terrorist
organisations, the provisions on organisations that advocate terrorist acts would be clearer if indicia as
to who in the organisation does the advocating and how were set out. In addition, crimes of
participation in terrorist organisations could be clarified by setting out indicia for the participatory acts
of membership and support. The provisions on association as a form of participation might be
simplified.
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The new preventative detention provisions could be clarified by elaborating the standards of
humane treatment by means of a protocol and by specifying that the Commonwealth Ombudsman is
responsible for review of administration of the preventative detention safeguards. Material
consequences for failure to comply with safeguards in the implementation process for confirmation of
control orders need to be introduced to ensure their effectiveness. Further, guidelines clarifying the
grounds on which an organisation might be proscribed under the prohibitions on mercenary activities
would be useful to clarify the scope of mercenary crimes. The overhaul of the crime of sedition
appears utile, although its articulation of the intention to urge violence could be made clearer. The
scope of the assisting the enemy in offence of treason might be clarified by requiring that the
assistance be material.
Finally, concerning the more profound policy questions, it might be noted that the Australian
Government acted following the bombings of the 11 September 2001 across a range of approaches.
National criminal laws form merely part of the broader effort required to combat extremist political
violence. Societal approaches include long-term strategic efforts to engage the potential perpetrators
constructively, through education, peer pressure and the addressing of grievances. Security-oriented
approaches include tactical efforts to gather intelligence, secure the movements of dangerous persons,
of weapons and of dangerous goods, to harden targets, to suppress the circulation of illegal funding
and propaganda, and to build cooperative domestic and international alliances. The criminal law
reforms that formed a part of this broader effort were initially accused of being a draconian ploy,
exploiting public fear to establish a police state. That alarm stimulated long and exhaustive public
scrutiny of the proposals, and thereby enhanced democratic accountability in the press and in
Parliament.295 However, the alarm might itself be seen as exaggeratedly fearful, as the usual
constitutional safeguards for democratic process, including regularity of legislative action and a
separation of powers, were maintained. In the end, the best defence against potential oppressiveness of
public policy in Australia, as in all other democracies, remains the informed, sober and vigilant
exercise of public conscience by the majority of electors.
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